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ABSTRACT 
Individuals who experience personal plight legal issues face several barriers to justice. Low- and 
medium-income earners are especially disadvantaged, given the high financial, temporal, and emotional 
costs associated with accessing justice. Simultaneously, law schools are graduating more law students 
than jobs available. The imbalance leaves many young lawyers, with mounting debt, no means with 
which to pay off the debt. The purpose of this study is to assess the viability of a legal services reverse 
auction platform as a solution to the access to justice and lawyer oversupply problems.  
The feasibility study examines the characteristics of the business models of twenty-one Internet-
based reverse auctions. Commonalities between the eight successful legal services reverse auction 
platforms were compared to those of the thirteen unsuccessful legal services reverse auctions to draw 
inferences about whether or not a future legal services reverse auction would be feasible as a new venture 
and, if so, how to implement the basic strategy and structure of the new venture. The study revealed that a 
legal services reverse auction new venture would be feasible, pending further study. The study analysis 
identified that supporting on-platform collaboration between lawyer and client, making various non-
traditional billing methods available, maintaining lawyer profitability, and offering business or 
entrepreneur legal services in addition to personal plight are likely critical to the success of a future legal 
services reverse auction new venture. 
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CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION  
Access to justice is not affordable to all. It may not even be affordable for most (Semple, 
Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 21). Access to justice, the “equal right to participate in every 
institution where law is debated, …, administered, … and applied,” can be more broadly interpreted to 
mean the legal system’s recognition of the need to reduce “substantive injustice” for those in pursuit of 
justice (Law Commission of Ontario Part One). An access to justice deficit exists in Canada. One study 
showed that every three years, nearly 50% of Canadians encounter a personal plight legal issue, and yet 
only 20% of those benefitted from professional legal advice (Farrow 1, 7-8; Semple, Accessibility, 
Quality, and Profitability 21). Most middle-income earners earn too much to qualify for government-
funded legal aid services, yet are unable to afford professional legal services (Farrow 9; Semple, 
Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 21). The access to justice deficit may be even larger in the United 
States (Matthews and Botero 25). 
Accessing justice typically requires the services of a lawyer. Lawyers, though, are on average 
inherently profit-motivated professionals who employ others, maintain offices, are liable for large law 
school debts, and are interested in earning an above-average salary. Moreover, lawyers hold the regulatory 
and professional requirements necessary to competently represent others in legal disputes or transactions, 
and thus hold a monopoly on the offering of such legal services. While lawyers are not benevolent beings, 
they are arguably under an ethical duty to ensure access to justice (McDowell and Sheikh 6-10). In 
addition, changing economic and market factors may signal that the current legal services business model 
employed by most law firms has or will become unsustainable. It is thus imperative that the legal services 
industry find innovative and profitable solutions to offer legal services to those who cannot afford them. 
Can a legal services reverse auction enterprise help solve some of the access to justice crisis 
present in North America? If so, what are the characteristics of such an enterprise? What type of strategy 
is required in order for the enterprise to succeed financially? This paper is an inductive feasibility study of 
the legal services reverse auction business model whereby clients propose legal issues they need 
assistance with, qualified lawyers bid in some form on the right to offer those services, and clients select a 
winning bidder. The paper will: 
• Explore the underlying access to justice issues facing potential legal services clients in Canada 
and the United States,  
• Analyze the economics of the legal services industry, including the balance between new law 
graduates and available legal positions, 
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• Review the economic factors present in Canada and the United States which suggest that the 
current, typical legal services business model is both unsustainable and failing to meet the needs of a 
significant percentage of potential legal services clients, 
• Review the previous or current attempts to build a legal services reverse auction enterprise, 
• Parse out the various market and regulatory factors inherent in and review the strategies and 
outcomes of each attempt, and 
• Propose lessons learned and determine whether the business model is feasible, in light of the 
underlying context and market factors. 
The results of the feasibility study demonstrate that a gap exists in the legal services market for 
low- to middle-income earners who require personal plight legal services but are unable to afford them. 
The evidence also suggests that there are, year over year, more new law graduates than open lawyer job 
positions, resulting in graduates struggling to find employment and, consequently, being unable to pay 
down large law school debts. A review of the business models of over twenty current or past legal 
services reverse auction enterprises identified several key components of success in the marketplace, 
including on-platform collaboration and payment facilitation. The regulatory structures of North 
American jurisdictions were found to allow such reverse auction business models but to do so under 
narrow circumstances. Finally, several corporate-level strategic considerations were identified as critical 
to bringing a future legal services reverse auction enterprises to market, a possibility ultimately 
determined to be feasible. 
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CHAPTER 2 — JUSTICE, AFFORDABILITY, AND THE BUSINESS OF LAW 
Affording Justice, A Treacherous Journey 
The journey from where a legal need arises to its conclusion can be treacherous. When a 
transactional or dispute-based legal need arises, it is in a person’s best interest to hire a lawyer. This is so 
because persons represented by legal counsel in legal disputes are more likely to achieve a desired 
outcome (Sandefur 909; Rehaag 71; Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 22). It is here, 
though, that the cost of justice begins to tally. First, the person must decide whether, at least at the outset, 
to be represented by counsel or not. Lawyer-seeking persons typically rely on referrals from friends, 
family, and other lawyers as well as internet research to find a lawyer and are more likely to choose law 
firms offer a free initial consultation (Clio 16-17). The entire search results in significant temporal costs.  
After choosing a lawyer, clients must then retain him or her to represent them. In 2017, 87% of 
Canadian lawyers charged their clients by the hour (the “billable hour”) (Hendry 32), and this remained 
unchanged in 2018 (Bruineman 21). The average hourly rate of a lawyer in Canada in 2018 ranged from 
$208.12 to $511.47, depending on years of experience and firm size (Bruineman 21-22). The national 
average cost of civil litigation up to but not including a two-day civil trial ranged from $10,000 to 
$15,000 (Bruineman 22). A contested divorce likely costs a Canadian anywhere from $7,500 to $12,500 
(Bruineman 23). The cost of a one-day criminal trial ranged from $5000 to $8000 (Bruineman 23). Of 
course, not one of these costs guarantees a desirable result. 
Some lawyer-seeking persons may qualify for state-funded legal services. The province of 
Ontario funds the legal needs of some via its Legal Aid Ontario agency. Access to funds, however, is 
limited to persons in specific circumstances. There are also gross family income thresholds which, 
depending on family size, serve as cut-offs from access to state funding. The thresholds are noted below 
in Table 1. Though the thresholds typically increase in value each year, the 2019 Ontario budget has 
cancelled these increases, and thus the thresholds will remain at 2018 levels moving forward 
(Mojtehedzadeh, "Cuts to legal aid”). Persons finding themselves below a Step 1 gross family income will 
likely qualify for state funding, whereas those with gross family incomes between Step 1 and Step 2 may 
qualify but will likely be required to make monthly contribution payments ranging from $50 to $115 to 
reimburse some or all of the legal expenses incurred (Legal Aid Ontario, Need a Lawyer). If you own a 
home, you may only qualify for a contribution agreement, depending on your income. 
While the merits of Legal Aid Ontario’s funding regime are laudable, many lawyer-seeking 
persons from Ontario will simply not qualify. In 2015, the median household income in Ontario was 
$74,287 (Statistics Canada, Household Income in Canada). Economic families of all sizes earning a gross 
family income of less than $50,000 in 2015 in Ontario represented just 21.2% of the population (Statistics 
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Canada, Distribution of market, total and after-tax income). In 2016, 69.7% of Ontario residents owned a 
home (Statistics Canada, Housing in Canada). Hence, nearly 80% of Ontario residents will not qualify for 
state funding. Furthermore, only 26% of Canadian law firms engage in legal aid work (Bruineman 25), 
which further increases the temporal and emotional costs of seeking justice. The majority of Ontario 
residents seeking lawyers must, therefore, finance their own legal services, represent themselves, or 
choose not to participate at all (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 22). 
Even after retaining a lawyer, be it personally or through the assistance of the state, the 
experience of seeking justice continues to exact a toll. Most individuals are not legally savvy and at the 
time of requiring legal services have likely never worked with a law firm (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, 
and Profitability 23). Most people have no real way of assessing the value or quality of the legal services 
provided to them (Standing Committee on Access to Justice 18). The information asymmetry and the 
resultant effects often lead to high emotional costs (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 
23-25). 
Such persons may choose to represent themselves. One study concluded that in 2011/12 in 
Ontario, 64% of family litigants at the time of filing were self-represented (Macfarlane 33). The same 
study found that up to 70% of civil litigants in various Canadian jurisdictions were self-represented 
(Macfarlane 34). Over 90% of respondents indicated the cost of retaining a lawyer as a factor in deciding 
to self-represent (Macfarlane 39). Over half of the respondents explicitly identified that they were unable 
to finance legal services (Macfarlane 39). Similarly, 53% of the study participants had hired a lawyer for 
their civil or family matter only to exhaust their resources and resort to self-representation (Macfarlane 
42). Respondents to the survey chose to self-represent despite largely believing that they were less 
competent than a lawyer at legal representation and reporting feeling frightened and overwhelmed at the 
prospect of self-representation (Macfarlane 41). Clearly, the journey from the time a legal need arises to 
its conclusion is bumpy and burdensome, if not treacherous.  
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Table 1. Legal Aid Ontario Gross Family Income Funding Thresholds
Number of Family 
Members Step 1 Income Step 2 Income
For Domestic Violence, 
Gross Family Income
1 $14,453 $16,728 $22,720
2 $25,003 $30,110 $32,131
3 $28,503 $35,088 $39,352
4 $32,207 $40,307 $45,440
5+ $35,749 $45,446 $50,803
Single boarders $9,501 $10,973 N/A
(Legal Aid Ontario, “Need a Lawyer”)
The Business of Law 
The provision of legal services is a noble field. Lawyers are, at their core, professionals who help 
others. They are obligated to act in all matters professionally and with integrity (Rules of Professional 
Conduct 2.1-1). Lawyers are also fiduciaries in that they must set aside their personal interests in favour 
of those of their clients when working on a client matter. Lawyers can be classified into quadrants based 
on the type of work they do and the type of client they serve. In his foundational work Accessibility, 
Quality, and Profitability for Personal Plight Law Firms: Hitting the Sweet Spot, Noel Semple 
characterizes these positions collectively as the four quadrants of legal practice, as illustrated below in 
Table 2.  
The Personal Plight quadrant is the space in which the access to justice crisis in Canada largely 
resides. The diverse legal problems occupying the quadrant transcend gross family income, geographical 
location, and level of education and consist of contested divorces, dismissals from employment, criminal 
charges, and other common legal problems (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 21). Middle-
income earners are largely the bearers of the access to justice crisis in that they are too affluent to qualify 
for state funding but are typically unable to afford the going rate of legal services (Trebilcock 4; Semple, 
Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 21). Furthermore, the necessity of profit, the traditionalism of the 
legal services industry, and the resultant comfort for lawyers in that profession that has likely led to the 
access to justice deficit.  
Revenues Minus Expenses Equals Profit 
The practice of being a private lawyer, or running a private law firm, is a business and must be 
profitable. The duty to ensure access to justice cannot subsume a lawyer's revenue-earning opportunities; 
providing access to justice is often not profitable (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 28). 
Profitability in offering legal services is critically important, not only to the lawyer, but to the law itself. 
While lawyers are paid professionals who serve the needs of others, they cannot work entirely for 
free. Canadian law school graduates incur on average $71,444 in student debt (Watson, “The Debt 
Burden”). More than 33% of such law graduates will owe over $90,000 upon graduation (Watson, “The 
Debt Burden”). Legal aid certificates, which finance a person’s legal services for a given legal matter, are 
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Table 2. The Four Quadrants of Legal Practice
Individual Clients
Personal Business 
-individual client, non-contested matters 
-wills, estates, real estate transactions
Personal Plight 
-individual client, contested matters 
-family law, civil litigation, criminal 
defense, estate litigation
Organizational 
Clients
Corporate Client Non-Contested 
-transactions 
-regulatory compliance
Corporate Client Litigation 
-commercial litigation 
-alternative dispute resolution
(Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 19-20)
not very lucrative and take away from a lawyer’s opportunity to earn market value for his or her legal 
services. In the fiscal year 2016/17, Legal Aid Ontario issued 112,109 certificates (Legal Aid Ontario, 
2016/17 Annual Report 25) worth a total of $254,356,000 (Legal Aid Ontario, 2016/17 Annual Report 
51-52). Including high-cost criminal trials, beneficiaries of Legal Aid Ontario certificates received an 
average of $2,269 of funding. In addition, the hourly rates Legal Aid Ontario will pay for legal services in 
areas other than Northern Ontario range from $109.14 to $136.43, depending on the lawyer’s certified 
years of experience (Legal Aid Ontario, Tariff and Billing Handbook). Certain legal matters funded by 
Legal Aid Ontario are paid at fixed rates. The most experienced lawyers can expect to earn anywhere 
from $151.94 for preparing and filing a bail variation application to $303.88 for conducting and 
completing a criminal bail hearing to $1,524.24 to attend criminal court to complete a withdrawal or stay 
of charges motion (Legal Aid Ontario, Tariff and Billing Handbook). Conversely, the most experienced 
criminal lawyers in Canada earn an average hourly rate of $431.01 (Bruineman 22). The average market 
price charged for a bail hearing in Canada is $1,001 to $1,500 (Bruineman 22). A one-day contested 
matter at criminal court will cost in Canada, on average, between $2,500 and $6,000 (Bruineman 22). The 
conclusion can be drawn, then, that lawyers who accept legal aid certificates incur opportunity costs: for 
every hour earning $136.43 or less working on a matter funded by the state, a lawyer is sacrificing an 
opportunity to earn significantly more at market rates. 
Profitability in offering legal services is also critical to the law itself. As aforementioned, lawyers 
are not entirely benevolent beings and cannot offer legal services for free or reduced rates in perpetuity. 
Lawyers must be remunerated in a fashion that continues to encourage potential lawyers to invest the time 
and effort to become licensed and offer personal plight services. If being a lawyer is not profitable, there 
will be no incentive for those potential lawyers to incur the significant debt and invest the significant 
amount of time into becoming a lawyer. This, in turn, would further enlarge the access to justice crisis in 
Canada as there would be fewer lawyers available to offer such legal services. The intersection of the 
unaffordability of legal services and the need for legal service profitability forms the basis of this 
feasibility study. 
Traditionalism and Private Legal Sector Billing Practices 
Lawyers most often generate revenue by charging clients by the billable hour. A retainer 
agreement is signed in advance which sets out the lawyer’s hourly rate, and the lawyer then, all else 
equal, works on the matter until its completion, keeps track of each tenth of an hour worked (Semple, 
Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 41), and bills the client for the number of hours worked at the 
hourly rate plus any acceptable expenses incurred (ie., application filing fees, title searches on a property, 
etc), and applicable taxes. Though hourly billing is not the exclusive method of billing clients, nearly 90% 
of Canadian lawyers use this method of revenue generation (Bruineman 21). 
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While there is certainly an emphasis on the billable hour, other methods are emerging. In the 2018 
Legal Fees Study, Canadian Lawyer Magazine found that 71% of respondents used flat fee arrangements 
(Bruineman 21). Other billing methods cited as being used by respondents included blended rates, 
contingency fees, and alternative fee arrangements. A description traditional and alternative billing 
methods is contained in Table 3 below. More than 70% of respondents to the Legal Fees Study indicated 
that they offer alternative billing arrangements in order to remain competitive (Bruineman 21). This 
indicates that many law firms in Canada position flat and alternative fee arrangements as components of 
their competitive advantages and value propositions. The fact that nearly 90% of law firms still make use 
of the billable hour, though, indicates that the legal profession is firmly entrenched in tradition. However, 
hourly billing is directly at odds with the interests of their clients and is at the forefront of the access to 
justice crisis. This is so because uncapped hourly billing provides no price certainty for clients, there is no 
current method of adequately measuring the value and quality of legal services to determine value for 
money, and it incentivizes lawyers to work inefficiently. 
Price Uncertainty  
 The uncapped billable hour provides no price certainty for potential clients. Law firms shift the 
risk that the matter will take more hours than might be expected to the client by charging for their services 
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Table 3. Description of Various Billing Techniques
Type of Fee Description
Billable Hour Each hour of work is billed at a pre-determined rate.
Flat Fee The client pays a single, pre-determined fee for the lawyer to perform the legal services necessary to complete the matter.
Blended Rate
The differing hourly rates of multiple lawyers working on a legal matter 
are averaged and this average rate is charged for each hour of work that 
each of the lawyers working on the file perform.
Contingency Fee
The client pays the lawyer a percentage of any award granted in a legal 
matter or a predetermined fee in which payment is dependant on the 
achieving of a certain outocme.
Alternative Fee Arrangements
Task Billing The client is charged a predetermined fee for each component of the legal service contracted.
Fee Collars An hourly rate with a minimum and capped maximum total fee.
Fixed Fee Plus The client is charged a pre-determined flat fee in addition to either an hourly rate on certain tasks or a success fee if the matter ends favourably.
Hourly Plus Contingency
The client is charged a pre-determined hourly rate, likely a reduced rate, on 
a portion or all of the services plus an additional fee which is contingent on 
the outcome of the matter.
Capped Billing The client is charged an hourly rate for all hours worked, but the final bill is capped at a pre-determined value.
Milestone Fee
The lawyer is responsible for moving the file to a pre-determined 
milestone, and additional fees are required for the lawyer to continue to 
work after the milestone is reached.
Unbundled Legal Services The lawyer completes a pre-determined portion of the total amount of work required by the client.
(LegalTrek Team, “Alternative Fee Arrangements”; Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 42-70)
by the hour (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 34). The arrangement is especially 
detrimental to personal plight clients. As Noel Semple points out, few major expenses in a person’s life 
require the acceptance of as much risk (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 34). For instance, 
a contested divorce could cost a client as little as $500 or as much as $25,000 (Semple, Accessibility, 
Quality, and Profitability 34). Even personal plight lawyers themselves acknowledge that they might not 
be able to afford their own services (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 33). Personal plight 
clients are thus faced with the prospect of mounting and uncontrollable legal bills which are also 
commonly paid in aggregate or in stages and in advance. This causes further emotional and financial costs 
to accrue and is thus not in the best interests of personal plight clients.  
Measuring Value 
 Objectively measuring the value of legal services has remained elusive. Legal service providers 
have long resisted being quantified and compared (Cohen, “What’s a Quality Law Firm”; Semple, 
“Measuring Legal Services Value” 1). This resistance is so even considering that clientele would benefit 
from the ability to compare legal services providers, and skilled legal services providers would benefit 
from being compared to their less skilled or apt counterparts (Semple, “Measuring Legal Services Value” 
1). Value in this sense refers to the effectiveness in achieving results, the affordability of the service, and 
the client experience (Semple, “Measuring Legal Services Value” 6-11). Faced with the inability to 
benchmark or compare lawyers, personal plight clients can never be sure whether the price they 
ultimately pay for legal services will represent good value for money. The power imbalance favours the 
lawyer and forces the client to trust that the final bill will have some modicum of value or be reasonably 
representative of the amount of skill and effort put into the matter. 
Inefficient Work Rewarded  
 The billable hour encourages lawyers to work longer and generate hours instead of client value 
(Woolley 871). When lawyers are paid by the hour, their best interest is to work as many hours as possible 
in order to generate as much revenue as possible. This arrangement is, however, problematic. A number of 
profit-motivated practices exist to increase the number of billable hours worked on a file. These practices 
include overstaffing or duplication of efforts; excessive legal research; failing to record hours worked 
contemporaneously; and, potentially, fraudulently recording working hours. (Woolley 871-883). What’s 
more, personal plight clientele are highly unlikely to be able to determine whether the number of hours 
worked by a lawyer on a particular matter is reasonable or even necessary. Personal plight clients are 
largely unable to assess final billings for the presence of unethical billing practices, and they are likely to 
go undetected if utilized. 
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Comfort: The Same Ol’ Song and Dance 
The practice of law is comfortable for lawyers. This is so because lawyers typically enjoy being 
paid regularly by clients, lawyers work long hours and are rewarded for doing so by the billable hour, and 
they own a near monopoly over offering legal services and do not have much need to innovate.  
According to a recent legal trends survey, lawyers enjoy a bill collection rate, defined as “the 
amount of billed work that gets paid,” of 86% (Clio 10). In comparison, a study of 230,000 invoices sent 
by small businesses found a collection rate of 84% (Rampton, “16 Signs”). Relatively speaking, then, 
lawyers collect payment for their services often. Most often, lawyers require deposits called “retainers” to 
be paid in advance, even though in the Personal Plight quadrant, they can act as a barrier to accessing 
justice (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 55-56). While lawyers are relatively assured of 
being paid for their services, what makes the profession even more comfortable is the remuneration 
structure. Over 70% of lawyers work longer than 8 hours a day (Clio 10). This regimen translates, subject 
to client acquisition, to a license for lawyers to earn as much money as they choose; working longer hours 
translates to more billable hours billed and, in turn, higher earnings.  
Finally, licensed lawyers own a virtual monopoly over the offering of legal services, which, 
somewhat reduces the need to innovate or adapt to changing market conditions. Outside of paralegals, 
who can offer only a limited subset of legal services, there are no other professionals who can offer 
competent legal services to personal plight clients. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult for non-lawyers to 
adequately fulfill personal plight legal needs without the assistance of a lawyer. While some innovation 
has been introduced within the other legal services quadrants, little obvious innovation of service 
offerings or best practice updates has accrued in the Personal Plight quadrant (Semple, Accessibility, 
Quality, and Profitability 26). The inaction suggests that personal plight practitioners either do not 
innovate because they do not need to or they innovate inconspicuously (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, 
and Profitability 27) which, though it may lead to a greater competitive advantage for the innovative 
practitioner, fails to adequately address the systematic access to justice issues. Overall, the prevalent use 
of the billable hour, combined with rising fees and a monopoly over the service offerings, suggest that the 
personal plight legal services industry is largely stuck within a perpetual cycle of profitability without 
significant need for industry-wide innovation.  
The business of law has, thus, not yet solved the affordability issue facing middle-class 
Canadians. According to a survey conducted by Canadian Lawyer Magazine, 43% of lawyers planned to 
increase their fees in 2018, while no respondent lawyers expected to reduce their fees (Bruineman 20). 
The Department of Justice estimates that the number of self-represented litigants has been rising since 
2000 and particularly since 2010 (Department of Justice, “Self Represented Litigants in Family Law”). 
Hence, while billable hour rates and legal fees continue to rise, so too does the number of litigants 
choosing to self-represent and consciously forego representation by a lawyer. The personal plight legal 
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needs of middle-income Canadians will continue to mount as access diminishes to the legal services 
personal plight clients require. The result signals that an industry-wide innovation which finds the “sweet 
spot” of accessibility, quality, and profitability (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 31-32) for 
personal plight legal services is both necessary and possibly imminent.  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CHAPTER 3 — THE FUTURE STATE OF THE LEGAL SERVICES INDUSTRY 
Is Change on the Horizon? 
Conventional economic theory suggests that change may be on the horizon for the legal services 
industry. The law of supply and demand holds that price fluctuations are a function of variations in the 
supply of and demand for a particular good or service. As demand remains constant, and supply increases, 
average price decreases. This is because service or goods providers have to compete more on price to 
attract clients or customers. There are several market factors which suggest that there may be an 
oversupply of lawyers in respect of legal services positions available. Importantly, though, the legal 
services industry and the economic factors underpinning it must be positioned with regard to jobs 
available to new law graduates and not, as some might expect, with respect to the number of self-
represented litigants or the general unaffordability of legal services. Given the nature of the legal 
profession and its monopolistic structure, there is, and will always be, demand for legal services 
providers. No inherent economical need thus exists for the legal services industry as a whole to engage in 
innovation to create new customer demand. Conversely, analyzing the economics of the legal services 
industry with a view to meeting unmet demand, especially within the Personal Plight quadrant, shifts the 
focus away from the necessary component of profitability to the provider and towards altruism. The 
analysis must, then, be centred on the ability of new graduates to find jobs and, more specifically, 
employment in positions requiring licensing. In so doing, the analysis will reveal the extent to which 
innovation will be required to create jobs sufficient to employ all law graduates who seek legal services 
employment. In this sense, the "employment pie” is expanded and in turn, so too is the ability to meet 
unmet demand, including that found in the Personal Plight quadrant. 
In 2014, the Law Society of Ontario introduced an articling program alternative called the Law 
Practice Program (the “LPP”) which was implemented to address the shortage of articling positions 
available to new law graduates (Mojtehedzadeh, “Ontario Law Practice Program”). Articling is an 
experiential work placement learning component required to be licensed as a lawyer in most jurisdictions. 
At the time the LPP was introduced, it was estimated that between 10 and 15% of new law graduates were 
unable to find a full articling position (Mojtehedzadeh, “Ontario Law Practice Program”). Despite the 
program being hosted at Ryerson University, the post-secondary institution formally applied to the 
Province of Ontario for approval to open a new law school (Balakrishnan, “Ryerson’s law school”) which 
it plans to do by 2020 (Friesen, “Ryerson going ahead with law school”). Even though it is estimated that 
by 2025 in Ontario there will be 1.6 new licensed lawyers for every one practicing position, and that 
currently only 10% of Ontario law firms offer articling positions, Ryerson will produce potentially several 
hundred annual additional law graduates starting in 2023. Interestingly, the Canadian Bar Association has 
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tacitly recognized since 2013 that the lack of control over the number of law school graduates may result 
in too great of a supply of lawyers (Arshinoff 20). 
Between 2009 and 2016 in Toronto, Ontario, the number of articling positions offered by the 
sixteen largest law firms declined every year except one with only a slight increase reported between 
2016 and 2017 (Wang, “The legal job market”). In 2009, the firms collectively offered 325 articling 
positions to new law graduates. By 2017, the same firms only offered 259 positions, a decrease of over 
20% (Wang, “The legal job market”). While hire-back rates have increased overall during that period 
(Wang, “The legal job market”), the fact that the number of positions available has decreased 
demonstrates that the law firms are attempting to accomplish more with less and that the overall prospect 
of being hired at these firms is now lower. 
Similar oversupply of lawyers has been recognized in other jurisdictions. In the United States 
generally, the number of lawyers per thousand residents increased by over 50% between 1980 and 2010, 
resulting in a scarcity of jobs available for new law graduates (Bilbrey "Using Hourly Fees and 
Innovation”). The number of lawyers per thousand residents was particularly high in Florida, at 9.1 
percentage points higher than the national average in 2010 — despite the underlying study finding that 
only 20% of individuals seeking some sort of civil justice benefited from the assistance of legal counsel 
or others (Bilbrey "Using Hourly Fees and Innovation”). In 2017, the Whittier Law School in California 
became the first accredited law school ever to shut down, a result caused in part by a 5% decrease in 
national new law graduate employment rates between 2007 and 2015 (Toppo “Why you might want to 
think twice”). Only two-thirds of law graduates were hired in positions which required passing a lawyer 
licensing exam in 2015, a decrease from the three-quarters of such graduates hired in 2007 (Toppo “Why 
you might want to think twice”). A task force assembled by the American Bar Association found that 
while law school admissions had dropped from 2010 to 2014, the decrease failed to reach the level 
necessary to match the reduction in jobs available to new law school graduates (Harper, “Too Many Law 
Students”). A 2011 study estimated that in thirty-four states, a surplus of at least 1.5 new law graduates 
existed per legal job opening, with twenty-five states experiencing a ratio of over 2:1 (Weissmann “The 
Absolute Worst States”). 
The National Association for Law Placement (“NALP”) conducts annual hiring studies in the 
United States to track trends of new law graduates. In 2017, the NALP found that 88.6% of new law 
graduates had been hired in a position, an increase from the 87.5% of such students in 2016 (Collins 1). 
However, only 71.8% of graduating students had been hired in positions that required passing a state 
licensing exam (Collins 1). As well, the number of available jobs dropped by 1,600 positions between 
2016 and 2017, and the rise in the employment rate was explained by the even sharper decline of new law 
graduates in 2017, down 2,200 from the year prior (Collins 1). Furthermore, the number of jobs available 
to new law graduates in the United States declined in 2017 for the fourth straight year (Collins 2). In 
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2017, the number of full-time and part-time license-requiring jobs reported as available to the NALP was 
24,373 for the reported 34,922 new law graduates (National Association for Law Placement, “Class of 
2017 National Summary Report”). It is thus evident that throughout Canadian and American jurisdictions, 
an oversupply of new law school graduates exists compared to the number of jobs available. 
At the same time, demand for legal services has remained relatively constant for much of the past 
decade. According to Thompson Reuters’ 2018 report on the state of the legal services industry in the 
United States, growth in demand for all legal services has remained relatively flat since 2008 (Jones et al 
4). Various sectors of the legal services market have experienced muted growth in demand for services, 
with the most prominent being the 1% increase in demand for corporate legal services in 2017 compared 
to 2016 data (Jones et al 5). The report noted that the various hiring practices alongside the lack of growth 
in demand for legal services, particularly in the litigation sector, had resulted in the continuing decline of 
productivity (Jones et al 5). Similarly, Altman Weil reported in its 2017 study that “decreasing demand for 
legal services is endemic in the profession,” noting that: 
• Over 50% of surveyed firms noted that their equity partners weren’t sufficiently  
busy;  
• Nearly two-thirds of surveyed firms’ non-equity partners were insufficiently busy;  
• One-quarter of firms reported that their associates were not busy enough; and 
• Fifty-nine percent of respondent firms blamed flat or declining market demand for the under-
performance (Seegar and Clay 2). 
Overall, then, the landscape of the legal services industry does not inspire confidence. The 
billable hour continues to reign and increase the costs to clients year-over-year, while law schools are 
graduating more students than law firms are prepared to begin employing. At the same time, demand for 
legal services has remained relatively constant, while the access to justice crisis in Canada and the United 
States has expanded. The situation suggests that there will continue to be an over-supply of lawyers and 
new law graduates saddled with nearly $100,000 in debt, and that law firms, in the fight to remain 
profitable, will continue to derive more value from fewer lawyers and partners.  
The basic economic theory of supply and demand suggests that, absent a significant reduction in 
law school admissions, lawyers will eventually have to compete on price which is, perhaps, the first step 
towards the commoditization of the legal services industry. Yet, innovation may ramp up in response to 
produce a profitable method to meet the legal services needs of potential, yet unserved clients. A suitable 
target for innovation is the Personal Plight client, a vast base of potential clientele with, arguably, the 
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most unmet legal services needs of all, who self-represent at staggering rates, and who can’t afford the 
market value of lawyers operating under the business model used in traditional legal services. 
Innovation Holds the Answer 
The paradox of a growing number of persons experiencing personal plight legal problems 
alongside unemployed new law graduates strongly suggests that the legal services market is primed for an 
innovative measure to return these imbalances to equilibrium. This is so because, given the large 
economical and temporal investments to become a lawyer, unemployed new law graduates will be forced 
to find some means to earn a living while paying off school debt so as to realize at least some return on 
investment. 
To date, there have been some attempts to innovate within the Personal Plight quadrant of the 
legal services industry. Many of the efforts have been helpful in creating affordability for personal plight 
clientele and have served to reduce the number of lawyer-seeking individuals who see through their legal 
issue without the assistance of counsel. Such innovations include: unbundled solutions, the rise of 
contingency fees outside of the personal injury context, low bono services, and alternative fee 
arrangements.  
The innovations are readily understandable. First, the typical legal service offered by a lawyer or 
law firm is bundled in that the lawyer takes on the entirety of the client’s matter from start to finish. A 
series of steps exists within each matter which the lawyer must complete either sequentially or 
simultaneously until it has concluded. The lawyer or law firm typically bills for each of the steps 
progressively throughout the duration of the legal matter. In contrast, some lawyers have chosen, in an 
effort to increase affordability, to unbundle the services and simply complete each of the requisite steps 
that the client seeks assistance with; rather than ordering the ‘buffet,’ the client selects items à la carte. 
Unbundling can occur by the stage of the case, an issue within the case, or simply by the task (Semple, 
Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 71-72). Some unbundling may involve coaching the client about 
how to undertake the aspects of the file which the lawyer does not (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and 
Profitability 71-72).  
Second, contingency fees, the payment of a pre-determined percentage of any award of damages 
or settlement to the lawyer or law firm, are in Canada and the United States most prevalent in personal 
injury cases (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 63). This fee structure makes some inroads 
with respect to creating access to justice for three reasons. Typically there is no upfront fee paid by the 
client to the lawyer, the number of hours a lawyer works does not affect the cost of the litigation, and, 
while price certainty isn’t guaranteed, the price paid by the client is proportionate to the award or 
settlement earned and is paid out of those proceeds (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 
!  14
63-64). The downside to clients is that the final price paid can be disproportionately high (Semple, 
Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 65). The Law Society of Ontario recently approved in principle a 
report recommending various regulatory changes to contingency fee structures (Law Society of Ontario, 
“Convocation approves plans”) which ought to increase the number of lawyers and law firms interested in 
structuring their fees in such a way, the types of matters which attract contingency fee structures, and the 
number of clients who request such a fee structure.  
Third, lawyers can offer low bono services to clients unable to afford market legal services rates 
by significantly reducing their cost. Lawyers agree to offer legal services to clients at hourly rates that are 
significantly lower than what the lawyers would ordinarily charge. Low bono legal services permit clients 
to access justice, while also giving lawyers an opportunity to earn revenue that might not have existed 
otherwise. Finally, lawyers can also offer any of the alternative fee arrangements referenced in Table 3 
above. In addition to the way in which legal services are charged, alternative fee arrangements also shift 
the timing and scope of legal services fees, which further increases a client's ability to access justice. 
What is at issue with all four of the legal services innovations is that they don’t entirely hit what 
Noel Semple characterizes as the “sweet spot” of accessibility, quality, and profitability (Accessibility, 
Quality, and Profitability 27-32). Any truly valuable innovation in the offering of legal services must 
maximize all three of the pillars to be sustainable, scalable, and be attractive to both clients and lawyers. 
Such an innovation will thus match the affordability of the legal services with the profitability of offering 
such services, deliver sufficient quality to provide clients the best value for money, employ more new law 
graduates, fend off lawyer commoditization, and decrease the number of self-represented litigants. Doing 
so may require a shift towards a freer market for offering legal services, which could reduce the power 
imbalance favouring the lawyer over the client, but in a manner which ultimately reduces the cost to the 
lawyer of offering such legal services.  
This paper proposes that an enterprise which provides a platform for clients to advertise their 
legal services needs upon which select, targeted lawyers with the requisite expertise and competence are 
permitted to bid on the job (a “reverse auction”) may over time provide an answer to the number of unmet 
personal plight legal services needs and address the access to justice crisis in Canada and the United 
States, while taking into account the abundance of job-less new law graduates, the potential slide to 
commoditization of the legal services industry, and the stagnant growth of the legal services market. Such 
an enterprise would create opportunities for clients to pay for legal services at prices dictated by the free 
market rather than at those dictated by individual lawyers and law firms. The enterprise would generate 
revenue, based on the regulatory restrictions in the various jurisdictions, through referral, subscription, 
transaction, or other fees. This paper is an exploratory study of the viability of such a legal services 
reverse auction enterprise. Available data on current or past legal services reverse auction ventures in the 
United States and Canada, along with market and economic factors, will be analyzed to determine the 
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favourability of launching a new legal services reverse auction platform. This paper will not, however, 
explore in great detail the precise format of the enterprise, pricing, location, feasible geographic markets, 
or financial feasibility, as these factors are out of scope and the subject of further review should a market 
for the enterprise be found to exist. 
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CHAPTER 4 — RESEARCH METHODS 
The investigative portions underpinning this project occurred in three stages. First, an extensive 
review of the literature was performed to uncover the contextual evidence underpinning the potential need 
for innovation in the legal services industry. This consisted of researching scholarly articles from the 
University of Windsor’s database in addition to other online sources. Other articles, books, blogs, 
commentaries, government resources, regulatory resources, and written pieces were reviewed to pinpoint 
the nature of the access to justice crisis in Canada and the United States. Additional evidence was 
reviewed to identify the nature of the legal services industry, the ability of personal plight clientele to 
navigate the system, the internal and external challenges which face lawyer-seeking individuals, the 
business of law, and the economic direction of the legal services market. Next, business management and 
entrepreneurialism literature was examined to identify findings pertinent to the feasibility of a reverse 
auction business model for the offering of legal services. 
Second, Internet-based research was conducted to determine whether or not a reverse auction 
legal services enterprise had ever been launched in Canada or the United States. Search terms used in this 
discovery process are located in Table 4. Search terms were selected based on keywords that potential 
clients looking for such a service would likely use to discover it, be it directly or indirectly. The terms 
"tender" and "request for proposals” were eliminated early in the process due to the inundation of open 
government tendering processes in the results. Lawyers are largely governed at the state or provincial 
level, and so the author assumed that any current or previous reverse auction ventures would be 
jurisdictional in nature. As a result, individual state and provincial jurisdictions were such added after 
each search term. Data were collected on the reverse auction enterprises uncovered using news articles, 
blog posts, interviews, articles, and a lawyer governing body. Such data included years of operation, 
geographical scope, enterprise headquarters’ location, legal services scope, client scope, revenue model, 
business model, and external investment. The availability of data varied significantly from case to case. 
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Table 4. Reverse Auction Discovery Search Terms
Lawyer bid on work [jurisdiction]
Cheap lawyer [jurisdiction]
Find a cheap lawyer [jurisdiction]
Find a lawyer [jurisdiction]
Lawyer referral service [jurisdiction]
Law bid [jurisdiction]
Bid on lawyer [jurisdiction]
Bid on legal services [jurisdiction]
Lawyer reverse auction [jurisdiction]
Third, research was conducted into the regulatory agency or governing body overseeing lawyers 
in each relevant state or provincial jurisdiction. Specifically, each body was consulted to determine the 
extent to which various referral or marketing fees are permitted. The author assumed that a reverse 
auction legal services enterprise would likely generate revenue from the lawyer offering legal services 
rather than the client seeking legal services, and, thus, it was imperative that the regulations governing 
referral and market fees be understood.  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CHAPTER 5 — ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND E-COMMERCE 
The business, e-commerce, management, and entrepreneurial literature was briefly reviewed in 
order to establish the framework within which a reverse auction business model might exist, attempt to 
understand the experiences of other entrepreneurs who have launched similar models in other industries, 
and, finally, to identify complications which may arise in launching an online reverse auction business 
model. The topic of online marketplaces and new venture creation remains largely unexplored in 
entrepreneurial research. For instance, a search of the Business Source Complete database using the 
keywords ‘online marketplace’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ returned only six peer-reviewed results. Some 
discussed startups which use eBay as a market conduit, equity crowdfunding, and Internet platforms as 
idea marketplaces. An article by Hamid Etemad was the most relevant. 
Etemad, an organizational theorist and marketing professor at the McGill University’s Desautels 
Faculty of Management, proposes that the Internet has created a plethora of opportunities for international 
entrepreneurialism to either emerge or expand (353-365). He identifies that such opportunities have 
emerged in stages and on a continuum in which each subsequent development disrupted its respective 
industries and created greater value for buyers and suppliers alike (Etemad 356). The review of the 
evolution of Internet-based entrepreneurialism identified two waves of expansion which directly appear 
applicable to the reverse auction business model. 
Etemad proposes that the first wave consisted of online information matching services and 
emerged in the market in the mid-1990s (356). These entities collected customer data for travel services 
and matched it with supplier inventory, be it flights, hotel rooms, or otherwise (Etemad 356). Entities such 
as Expedia, Travelocity, and All Hotels incurred little in the way of marginal costs to operate the matching 
services, as each implemented software to conduct the matchings of buyer and supplier (Etemad 356). 
The companies did not own any traditional travel assets such as hotels, airplanes, or rental vehicles 
(Etemad 356). The services saved consumers time, money, and effort, while suppliers were able to sell off 
excess inventory (Etemad 356).  
The second applicable wave Etemad identifies is the reverse auction website which became 
noteworthy with the launch of Price Line in 1997 (Etemad 358). Here, suppliers were required to bid on a 
consumer specification for travel. As bids dropped in value, the value to the consumer increased (Etemad 
358). The wave also expanded from offering reverse bids on services to goods (Etemad 358). 
The literature was otherwise relatively barren of applicable research. A search of the keywords 
‘online reverse auction’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ returned no results. Broadening the search to include terms 
such as ‘online marketplace’ and ‘management’ returned several articles on repetitional effects and 
competitive behaviours, none of which were directly relevant. Finally, a search narrowed to simply 
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‘online reverse auctions’ identified that the literature is mostly focused on understanding the dynamics 
and workings of business-to-business applications (“B2B”) of online reverse auctions, with an emphasis 
on supply management. See for example Jap 506-525, Emiliani and Stec, “Commentary” 167-171, and 
Emiliani and Stec, “Wood pallet” 278-288. 
Schoenherr and Mabert identify trends and correct several myths which pertain to B2B online 
reverse auctions in their 2007 article (373-384). First, the authors identify that reverse auctions are not 
only about price, but are also about finding vendors which offer good service or about narrowing the 
number of potential suppliers (Schoenherr and Mabert 374-376). The study identified that many reverse 
auctions include privilege clauses which permit the purchaser to select a bidder other than the lowest 
bidder (Schoenherr and Mabert 375). While the study confirmed that most reverse auctions are used for 
commoditized products, it also identified that purchasers had found ways to commoditize otherwise non-
commodities (Schoenherr and Mabert 377). One purchaser identified that they have used auctions for 
goods as complex as locomotives and as commoditized as toilet paper (Schoenherr and Mabert 377). 
Services were noted to be more difficult to auction than goods (Schoenherr and Mabert 377). Third, the 
authors identify that while reverse auctions originally had the potential to damage the purchaser-supplier 
relationship, suppliers are now more comfortable with the concept and this comfort increases with auction 
accessibility and ease of use (Schoenherr and Mabert 377-379). Fourth, the study confirmed that savings 
as a result of using an online reverse auction decreased over time for each purchaser, though this was 
typically in relation to repeat purchases of similar goods (Schoenherr and Mabert 380). Finally, the study 
debunked the myth that online reverse auctions will not exist for long in the B2B marketplace 
(Schoenherr and Mabert 381). 
Again, the study concerned B2B transactions, and, thus, its application to the business-to-
consumer (“B2C”) marketplace is potentially limited. There are, however, some takeaways. First, the 
article notes that reverse auctions for legal services in the B2B context occurred for at least one of their 
study respondents, and, second, it demonstrates the usefulness of qualitative research (Schoenherr and 
Mabert 377). My study, an exploration of online legal services reverse auctions, is a direct response. 
While there are plenty of other studies of B2B online reverse auctions (See, for example, Kwak 18; Hur et 
al. 21-29), these too have limited application in the B2C context. 
One other portion of the literature provided valuable insight. Mohamed Charki et al. identify that 
reverse auctions can present ethical issues to enterprise proprietors, buyers, and suppliers alike (17-37). 
The authors specify that in terms of online B2B reverse auctions, unethical behaviour is that which 
violates the common ideal of fair play and other widely accepted moral criteria (Mohamed Charki et al. 
19). Such unethical behaviours, the authors noted, could include, among others, shifting auction rules, 
changing contract terms between the time the request for bids is published and the awarding of the 
contract, reducing unit price without intention to actually change suppliers, and falsifying information 
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(Mohamed Charki et al. 19). The article notes that there exists a lack of literature surrounding the ethical 
issues inherent in reverse auctions (Mohamed Charki et al. 20). Though this article is again focused on the 
B2B context, it identifies that there are likely to be ethical issues to be addressed if creating an online 
reverse auction. Moreover, the concerns are likely accentuated by the reverse auctioning of legal services. 
Ethical issues could certainly affect a start-up's growth and, in the absence of focused scholarship, further 
study is required before creating a legal services reverse auction. 
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CHAPTER 6 — LEGAL SERVICES REVERSE AUCTION ENTERPRISES IN NORTH 
AMERICA 
The Legal Services Reverse Auction Model is Not New 
A legal services reverse auction, for the purposes of this paper, is defined as a for-profit business 
in which: 
• Clients communicate a legal need via an online platform or forum to qualified lawyers; 
• The qualified lawyers review and, if interested, communicate back to the client a bid to 
complete the pre-defined legal work required;  
• The client reviews the bids and selects a winner; and 
• The lawyer and client then enter into some sort of retainer agreement. 
The aforementioned constitutes a reverse auction because, unlike regular auctions, the purchaser auctions 
the opportunity to complete work at his or her behest, and, typically, a lower bid is preferred. Conversely, 
regular auctions feature the seller auctioning off a good or service and the highest bid is preferred.  
Internet-based research into the existence of legal services reverse auction enterprises 
(“LSRAEs”) in North America revealed several market entries of the basic business model. In total, 
twenty-one currently or previously operating LSRAEs were uncovered, a surprising figure given their 
relative absence from traditional legal services marketing channels. The enterprises offer or offered 
services to business and individual clients alike for matters spanning business law and personal plight law. 
The majority operate or operated in the United States. The existence of a plethora of LSRAEs provides an 
opportunity to analyze the commonalities and differences amongst them, identify the strategic choices in 
bringing the service to market and in continually improving the enterprise’s value proposition, identify the 
extent to which each enterprise incorporated the contextual factors underpinning this paper into their 
business models, and to determine inductively whether or not such an enterprise could profitably — both 
to the lawyer and the enterprise itself — serve personal plight clientele. A chart containing key markers of 
each LSRAE is contained at Appendix A.  
Scope of the Identified Legal Services Reverse Auction Enterprises 
As stated, an exhaustive investigation uncovered twenty-one LSRAEs in North America. Some 
have operated for several years, while others appear to have closed down after a short period of time in 
the market. Most operated within the confines of the United States, while only one, MyLawBid, operated 
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solely in Canada. One LSRAE operated on a global scale, while still one other offered services in select 
Commonwealth nations.  
All LSRAEs identified during the research phase conformed to the above-noted definition of a 
legal services reverse auction. Each typically offered an Internet-based platform on which clients could 
either post legal needs or create a profile with which to identify a legal need. Each required lawyers to be 
registered and pre-screened to some degree and lawyers were selected to view client postings based on 
established criteria. Each platform allowed for lawyers to somehow communicate with clients and to 
provide some format and quantum of cost to the client. Each LSRAE also permitted clients to select a 
lawyer from those who provided a bid of some sort.  
As previously noted, information availability varied. Of the twenty-one LSRAEs discovered, 
more information and data were uncovered for those which are either still in operation or which had 
recently ceased operations. The extent of marketing efforts appear to have impacted the amount of data 
available, because better-known LSRAEs were observed to have garnered more commentary. Data could 
not be collected about three LSRAEs that were identified. 
The LSRAEs generally offered personal plight, business, or a combination of both types of legal 
services. Two of the twenty-one LSRAEs offered specialized or distinct legal services. BernieSez offers 
traffic ticket legal services, and eLawForum offered litigation defence services on a portfolio basis to 
Fortune 100 and larger corporations. 
Limitations 
This feasibility study is based on inductive analysis of publicly available data. These data were 
collected from the Internet and were largely contained in articles, enterprise websites, blog posts, and 
other webpages. The value of this secondary data is somewhat limited in that it is not peer-reviewed. A 
second major limitation is that significantly less data were available for LSRAEs which are no longer in 
existence. While names of defunct LSRAEs were noted in articles and blog posts, little to no information 
was available for several of them, which is noted in Appendix A. Finally, although a substantial number of 
LSRAEs were identified, the twenty-one enterprises constitute a limited sample size for completing 
certain types of statistical analyses.  
Characteristics and Commonalities of Successful Ventures 
What is Success? 
For the purposes of this paper, a LSRAE is considered successful if it is currently offering 
services to the market. Of the twenty-one LSRAEs discovered, the youngest two were both opened in 
2015. This demonstrates that those actively offering services have existed for at least three years, which 
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would seem to demonstrate a baseline of success. One of the inactive LSRAEs, Shpoonkle, operated for a 
period of two to three years but closed in 2014. Despite meeting a temporal activity baseline of three 
years, the venture is still considered unsuccessful for having closed operations. There are currently eight 
known active LSRAEs offering services: Legal Services Link, BernieSez, Lawger, UpCounsel, 
Legalmatch, Priorilegal, Lawtrades, and Lawdingo. They share several commonalities.  
Lifespan 
Of the eight successful LSRAEs, seven have enjoyed an average lifespan of five years, having 
commenced operations as early as 2011 and as late as 2015. The single outlier, Legalmatch, appeared on 
the market as early as 1999 and has been in business for twenty years. 
Geographic Scope 
Six of the eight successful LSRAEs currently offer legal services nationwide in the United States. 
BernieSez, which functions as a platform to connect lawyers with individual clients who have been given 
a traffic ticket, operates in North Carolina and Pennsylvania only. The geographic scope of Lawtrades is 
unknown. Interestingly, Legal Services Link has a dual business model which offers some insight into its 
competitive strategy. While Legal Services Link does offer services across the United States, it has 
partnered with three distinct jurisdictions or groups to offer its platform in a more official capacity. The 
Arizona State Bar has contracted with Legal Services Link to offer personal plight clientele in the state 
the opportunity to post their legal needs to an Arizona State Bar website, run by Legal Services Link, in 
which Arizona-licensed lawyers who pay an annual premium can respond to and bid on these 
opportunities. Recently, the Arizona State Bar exercised its renewal rights to extend the contract with 
Legal Services Link through March of 2020 (as noted in Appendix B). Legal Services Link has also 
contracted with the Virgin Islands Bar Association and the Military Spouse JD Network to offer similar 
services in the United States or its territories. One other LSRAE, Legalmatch, has received favourable 
official opinions from several state bars and partnered with the Utah State Bar in 2005, although it is not 
clear whether or not this relationship continues to date (Legal Match, “State Bar Associations”). The State 
Bars of Utah, Alaska, California, Ohio, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Louisiana, Maryland, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina all currently offer a service called Licensed Lawyer which 
provides a guided search mechanism for potential clients to find lawyers, but which does not include a 
bidding function (Licensed Lawyer, “Find a Lawyer”). It is unknown if any of the other LSRAEs, 
successful or not, have attempted to form official partnerships with lawyer licensing bodies in any 
jurisdiction. Five of the successful LSRAEs are headquartered in either New York City or San Fransisco, 
while the others are located in Raleigh, NC; Eugene, OR; and Chicago, IL. 
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Legal Services & Client Scope 
The scope of legal services offered by the successful LSRAEs is surprising. Contrary to what was 
expected, most offer some form of personal plight legal services. In fact, half of the successful LSRAEs 
offer services which would be considered full-service in that they offer a wide range of both personal 
plight and business law legal services. Three others offer only business law services, while the last, 
BernieSez, is specialized in traffic ticket litigation. This legal focus, while technically a personal plight 
legal matter, does not suggest that a new LSRAE which solely offers personal plight legal services will 
tend to be successful. Not surprisingly, the four full-service LSRAEs offer services to both individuals 
and businesses. One of the three business law LSRAEs markets its services to both entrepreneurs and 
businesses, and the remaining two, Priorilegal and Lawtrades, specifically market to businesses alone. 
BernieSez markets only to individuals, which is necessary, given the nature of traffic ticket litigation.  
Revenue Model 
All but two of the eight successful LSRAEs generate revenue by charging some sort of fee to 
participating lawyers. One other, Priorilegal, charges clients, which consist solely of businesses, a 
management fee equivalent to 10% of the total legal fee paid to the lawyer for undertaking the services. 
The organization's business model, however, is slightly different from the others in that it provides 
potential business clients with a selection of qualified lawyers who have agreed, as a component of being 
featured on the Priorilegal platform, to discount their regular fees within a specified range. The lawyers 
thus compete on two levels — the percentage discount from the regular hourly rate and the marginal 
hourly rate charged. The other, UpCounsel, also charges clients a five percent management fee. The 
remaining six successful LSRAEs charge its lawyers a fee of some sort. Four charge lawyers on a 
temporal basis rather than by the legal matter. Legal Services Link, BernieSez, Legalmatch, Lawtrades 
charge lawyers a subscription fee on an annual or monthly basis. The subscription fee permits lawyers to 
either access client postings or be available to be selected by potential clients. Lawdingo generates 
revenue by having lawyers bid on the opportunity to be featured to clients. Here, the highest bidding 
lawyers on Lawdingo are shown to clients who have posted their legal needs, which then permits these 
lawyers to bid on the opportunity to complete the legal services. Finally, Lawger charges a referral or 
referral-equivalent fee equal to an unknown percentage of the legal services fee, although Lawger does 
permit lawyers to pay a subscription fee to effectively pre-pay its “transactional technology fee.”  
Business Model 
The characteristics of each of the successful LSRAEs vary and are noted in aggregate at 
Appendix C. The majority of the successful LSRAEs maintain the lawyer-client relationship on the 
platform. Of the eight LSRAEs, seven allow for collaboration between the lawyer and client on the 
platform itself, rather than offline or otherwise. All eight require that clients create a profile. The lawyers 
who are able to view and bid on client postings are selected by the LSRAEs in a variety of ways. Only 
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lawyers who are qualified to offer legal services for a given matter are permitted to do so on all LSRAEs 
and in accordance with the rules of professional conduct across jurisdictions. Lawyer selection ranges 
from a proprietary algorithm, to geographic constraints, to no constraints. The lawyer selection process 
for two of the LSRAEs is unknown. The retainer and legal services fee payment method occurs entirely 
on the platform of four of the successful LSRAEs, where the client contracts with the lawyer and deposits 
funds which are then remitted to the lawyer. One other LSRAE features an off-platform retainer but on-
platform payment method. Legalmatch requires both the retainer and the fee payment to occur off-
platform. Of the remaining three, two feature legal services fee payment on the platform and either off-
platform or unknown retainer processes. The remaining venture, Legal Services Link, features an off-
platform retainer process and an unknown payment process.  
Three of the successful LSRAEs — UpCounsel, Lawtrades, and Lawdingo — were discovered to 
have attracted, respectively, external investment funding of $26 million over six rounds, $2.7 million over 
two rounds, and $810,000 over four rounds. Both UpCounsel and Lawtrades exclusively offer business 
law services, while Lawdingo offers personal plight legal services. Of note, a variety of fee structures, 
including hourly rates, flat fees, capped fees, and contingency fees were available across the successful 
LSRAEs. 
Characteristics and Commonalities of Unsuccessful Ventures 
What is Failure? 
A failed LSRAE, for the purposes of this paper, is any such enterprise which does not achieve 
sustained operations. Despite the simple definition, the data suggest that there are ranging levels of 
failure. While some failed LSRAES existed for no more than a year or two, some existed for three years 
and one, eLawForum, appears to have operated for at least a decade. Ultimately, given the nature of an 
exploratory study, the failure to operate as a going concern tends to favour defining an operation as 
unsuccessful despite the length of operation. The failed LSRAEs are: BidsFromLawyers, EagleFee, 
eLawForum, ExpertBids, HireMeLegal, JammedUp, Jurbid, LawPitch, LawyerBid, LawyersforLess, 
LawyersQuoteFast, MyLawBid, and Shpoonkle. 
eLawForum 
The business model of the outlier, eLawForum, establishes the venture as largely irrelevant to the 
study of personal plight legal services reverse auctions. The venture’s service offering consisted of a 
method for large corporations to aggregate litigation matters into a portfolio whereby law firms would bid 
on the opportunity to represent the corporations for the matters spanning their entire portfolios. The model 
is not helpful because of its strictly B2B application and because it generated value by creating economies 
of scale through the combining of similar matters into a portfolio, The factors are not akin to the 
experiences of an individual with personal plight legal needs.  
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The venture’s business model appears to have been successful for a period of time. A business 
case was even written about the venture (Christenson, “eLawForum”). Recently, eLawForum appears to 
have restructured into an entity called Drystone Capital, which does not appear to offer litigation bidding 
services any longer (Drystone Capital, “Drystone Capital”). Despite eLawForum’s longevity and its 
apparent success for some time, it will be deemed a failure for the purposes of this study to reflect that it 
no longer operates and that its business model fails to meaningfully inform this study. 
Lifespan  
Overwhelmingly, the lifespans of the failed LSRAEs were short. Often, the exact year a failed 
LSRAE ceased operations was unclear. In such a case, the year of the last online activity of the LSRAE 
was interpreted as the final year of operations. Excluding eLawForum, which appears to have operated for 
approximately twelve years, the average lifespan of the failed LSRAEs was three years. 
Geographic Scope 
Most failed LSRAEs operated at a national level in either the United States or Canada. Only two 
— Lawpitch and eLawForum — offered services in other countries. The geographic scope of five of the 
failed LSRAEs is unknown. 
Legal Services & Client Scope 
Four of the failed LSRAEs offered legal services to both individuals and businesses. Five others 
offered services to either individuals or businesses. Of these, only eLawForum offered services strictly to 
businesses. The remaining four offered legal services only to individuals. Information regarding legal 
services and client scope was unavailable for the remaining four failed LSRAEs. 
Revenue & Business Model 
Much of the way in which the failed LSRAEs structured their business models or generated 
revenue is unknown. The aggregated revenue and business model characteristics are noted at Appendix D. 
Three failed LSRAEs generated revenue by requiring lawyers to pay either a monthly subscription, 
winning bid, or bid fee. Two failed LSRAEs charged clients either a management fee or a fee 
commensurate with the cost saved (as compared to the cost of the market value of the same legal 
services). The method of revenue generation for the remaining six LSRAEs is unknown. Only six of the 
failed LSRAEs required clients to create a profile. One permitted clients to upload documents and one 
other permitted clients to set a pre-determined budget for lawyers to bid under. Three platforms 
geographically constrained the lawyers permitted to bid on client postings. One applied a proprietary 
algorithm to determine which lawyers would be permitted to bid on client postings. Three failed LSRAEs 
did not constrain lawyers, except by competence, to offer specific legal services. The ways in which the 
remaining three LSRAEs constrained lawyers, if at all, is unknown. Two failed LSRAEs, Lawpitch and 
HireMeLegal, required that retainer agreements be signed offline or off-platform and that all collaboration 
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for the matter requiring legal services occur offline or off-platform as well. Interestingly, both also 
permitted legal services fees to be paid on the platform. Various fee structures were available to clients, 
including most prevalently flat rates and contingency fees. No external investment was discovered. 
Comparison of Successful and Unsuccessful Ventures 
The differences between the successful and unsuccessful ventures are palpable and convey 
several hints at what might be necessary, in terms of structure, characteristics, and business model, for a 
future LSRAE to operate successfully.  
Timing 
One factor which appears to have been critical to the success of some and the failure of other 
LSRAEs is the period in which they were launched. On average, successful LSRAEs commenced 
operations in 2013, while unsuccessful LSRAEs were, on average, launched in 2010. The collapse of the 
North American economies in 2008 led to a surge in law school applications (Ruiz, “Recession Spurs 
Interest in Graduate, Law Schools”). The consequential over-supply of lawyers did not thus begin until 
three years later in, 2011, and did not begin to compound for a few years afterwards. Commencing a 
LSRAE sometime after 2011, thus, was economically more likely to be successful because there would 
have been more lawyers to meet relatively stagnant demand (Weissmann “The Absolute Worst States”). 
One other possible explanation is that lawyers have continuously become more interested in incorporating 
technology into their practices (Goyal, “Tech competence a must”).  
Yet one other explanation is that the successful LSRAEs have not yet had a chance to fail and are 
simply successful because, unlike their unsuccessful counterparts, insufficient time has passed. However, 
this explanation is not likely to be the case. Not including the eLawForum outlier, the average lifespan of 
unsuccessful LSRAEs was three years, while the successful LSRAEs have enjoyed an average lifespan of 
5 years to date. It thus appears that successful LSRAEs have existed long enough to have had a chance to 
fail, and, they overcame or avoided whatever deficiencies existed in the unsuccessful LSRAEs which 
caused their demise. The eLawForum platform is a curious outlier in respect to timing. The venture 
appears to have ceased operations in 2010, shortly after the 2008 financial collapse despite offering a 
method for companies to save cost on litigation. One explanation may be that such companies looked to 
eliminate as many costs as possible by putting off litigation as long as possible. Another explanation 
could be that eLawForum was simply wound down so its shareholder could pursue other opportunities. 
Geographical Scope 
The geographic scope components of both the successful and unsuccessful LSRAEs were largely 
similar, with legal services generally offered nationwide in the United States. However, the similarity is 
qualified in that the geographic scope of many of the unsuccessful LSRAEs remains unknown. Some of 
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the successful LSRAEs operated in select jurisdictions, and still some others attempted to partner or work 
with state bar associations or provincial law societies. Strategically, it would likely be more feasible to 
build a brand in a single jurisdiction and build out from there. This strategy and the regulatory 
environment in North American jurisdictions will be discussed later. The United States offers a plethora 
of densely populated jurisdictions in which the same rules of professional conduct generally apply. This 
would suggest that, to start, the United States would be a beneficial parent jurisdiction in which to 
operate. There is, however, substantial competition in the United States which is not at all present in 
Canada. This strongly suggests that operating in the parent jurisdiction of Canada may be advisable. 
Revenue & Business Model 
The successful LSRAEs generated revenue from lawyers in some fashion, be it a subscription fee 
or a fee tied to the legal matter completed. Those which charge clients a fee operate solely within the 
business law context and only count businesses as their clients. This is likely because corporations value 
the fees saved enough to see the benefit of paying a fee for the service, as long as the fee paid is justified 
by the savings. In contrast, some unsuccessful LSRAEs charged even personal plight clients a fee. Of 
those, one charged clients a fee proportionate to the amount saved on the market value of the legal 
services required. Importantly, the arrangement may be a successful revenue model in a future LSRAE, 
although otherwise charging personal plight clients a fee does not appear to be feasible.  
The two major components of the LSRAE business model which likely create value for both 
clients and lawyers are the way in which lawyers are selected by the LSRAE to bid on potential projects 
and the extent to which clients and lawyers collaborate on the platform. Yet, there was no clear difference 
in the way in which lawyers were selected by successful and unsuccessful LSRAEs. Each varied in the 
way in which lawyers became eligible to bid on appropriate legal services requests from clients. Some 
restricted bids to geographical areas, others applied a proprietary algorithm to aggregate eligible bidding 
lawyers, and still others did not restrict who could bid. Strategically, matching the way in which lawyers 
become eligible to bid on projects with the nature of the specific project would likely be beneficial and 
will be discussed later.  
The degree to which clients and lawyers collaborate on the LSRAE platform appears be an 
important aspect of the LSRAE value proposition. Seven of the eight successful LSRAEs offered at least 
one component of platform collaboration. Examples include the retainer process, in-matter collaboration 
(such as communication), document signing or review, and the method in which lawyers are paid for legal 
services. Conversely, the extent to which the unsuccessful LSRAEs permitted on-platform collaboration is 
largely unknown. Only two, LawPitch and HireMeLegal, were discovered to offer a component of on-
platform collaboration which, in the case of both, was lawyer payment. Half of the successful LSRAEs 
offered on-platform retainer processes, in-matter collaboration, and lawyer payment, while two others 
offered both in-matter collaboration and lawyer payment. Thus a LSRAE is more likely to be successful if 
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it offers on-platform collaboration, even though this observation is tempered by the unknown 
characteristics of many of the unsuccessful LSRAEs. 
Legal Services and Client Scope 
Solely offering personal plight legal services to individuals appears infeasible. With the exception 
of the specialized traffic ticket LSRAE BernieSez, not one of the successful LSRAEs offers only personal 
plight legal services. Rather, the others offer business law services to entrepreneurs and/or corporations as 
well. Conversely, the four general LSRAEs which solely offered personal plight legal services failed to 
operate on average past three years. Building a dedicated personal plight LSRAE in the future will likely 
not be feasible, barring strong brand recognition. Thus any future LSRAE would likely be required to 
offer business law services in addition to remain profitable.  
Regulatory Environment & Restrictions 
Each provincial and state jurisdiction in Canada and the United States has the authority to 
regulate lawyers in the manner they choose. Lawyers in each of Canada’s fourteen provincial and 
territorial jurisdictions are self-regulated by way of a law society. Each law society has published a code 
of professional conduct which all lawyers must adhere to and which governs the way in which lawyers 
offer legal services. While the rules of professional conduct vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the 
premise of each is largely the same. Lawyers in each of the United States’ state jurisdictions are also self-
regulated via state law or bar societies. While each of the self-governing bodies is free to create its own 
set of rules which dictate the way in which legal services can be offered, all states but California have 
adopted model rules developed by the American Bar Association (American Bar Association, 
“Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules”). Appendix E identifies, by North American jurisdiction, the 
various pertinent regulations which may affect the way in which a future LSRAE operates and, most 
importantly, feasibly generates revenue (including referral fees, fee splitting, legal services marketing, and 
for-profit referral program restrictions). A review of the various lawyer professional codes of conduct 
reveals that any such future LSRAE will need to be carefully structured so as to not run afoul of the 
strictures.  
A future LSRAE could exist in multiple organizational forms. Legal services cannot be offered by 
anyone other than lawyers with few, discrete exceptions (such as paralegals in Ontario). Moreover, 
lawyers cannot offer legal services from a regular corporation and must operate as sole practitioners, in 
partnerships, or, in the jurisdictions which allow them, in professional corporations. Professional 
corporations cannot be owned by non-lawyer persons or regular corporations. Hence, a future LSRAE, if 
not incorporated as a professional corporation, cannot offer legal services. This regulation is critical 
because, while all North American jurisdictions permit legal services fee splitting between multiple law 
firms, they also prohibit fee splitting with non-lawyers and non-law firms. Furthermore, fee splitting 
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between lawyers of different law firms must be done in a manner which proportionately compensates the 
lawyer based on the amount of work.  
A future LSRAE could potentially be set up as a professional corporation, for instance, and offer 
triage legal services for a small portion of the legal services fee ultimately charged by the lawyer selected 
by the client. However, there are three immediate drawbacks to the structure. First, offering triage 
services would limit the percentage of the overall legal services fee that could be charged, limiting 
income opportunities. The portion of the legal services likely could not constitute more than 5% of the 
overall fee and would be more likely to represent 1-3% of any such services. Second, if the future LSRAE 
is set up as a professional corporation and offers legal services, even in a limited sense, it will be open to 
professional liability claims by clients under the rules of professional conduct of the jurisdictions in which 
it operates. For example, if the selected lawyer is accused of professional wrongdoing, the future LSRAE 
would very likely become a third-party defendant to that matter. In response, the future LSRAE could 
attempt to have the selected lawyer indemnify it via the contract between the two, though it is unknown to 
what extent a lawyer can contract out of professional liability. Third, existing as a professional 
incorporation significantly limits external investment opportunities because any investor would have to be 
a lawyer. While it is perhaps possible that external investments could be structured as loans with various 
return-on-investment schemes (such as royalty payments or high interest), they could violate professional 
conduct rules because the North American regulatory bodies generally prohibit lawyers from indirectly 
violating the rules of professional conduct.  
A future LSRAE could also exist as a referral agency. With the exception of the jurisdictions of 
Prince Edward Island, Yukon, and California, only lawyers may be paid a referral fee. There are also 
stipulations which govern when referral fees can and cannot be paid, though these would likely not be 
relevant to a future LSRAE. A distinct referral agency would thus also be required to exist as a 
professional corporation which would expose it to all the previously mentioned issues. With the exception 
of Ontario, which specifies a specific formula for calculating maximum referral fees, all other North 
American jurisdictions require only that such referral fees be reasonable or proportionate. This does not 
meaningfully limit the revenue-generation possibilities of a future LSRAE.  
There is, however, an alternate format which could still remain within the boundaries of the North 
American jurisdictions. All United States jurisdictions permit lawyers or law firms to pay lead generator 
fees (American Bar Association, “Rule 7.2: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services: Specific 
Rules - Comment”). Within Canada, and except for Ontario and possibly Quebec, a referral or lead 
generator fee may be paid if the fee is not tied to a specific matter or if such fees lead to the possibility of 
referring clients generally (as opposed to specifically). The structure would also require that no specific 
lawyer is ever recommended by the future LSRAE. Hence, a future LSRAE could exist as a lead 
generator to which lawyers or law firms pay fees as a subscription or on a percentage of gross revenues 
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basis. Access to the future LSRAE platform could be permitted in exchange for monthly or annual fees 
which are not tied to specific clients or matters. Alternatively, lawyers or law firms could be billed on a 
monthly, bi-monthly, semi-annual, or annual basis a percentage of gross revenues earned over that period. 
Because the billing occurs after the matters have been referred and are not tied to any specific matter, 
revenues limited to lead generation could also remain within the rules of professional conduct for many 
jurisdictions. 
All jurisdictions in North America permit lawyers to market their services, including the price of 
such services as long as certain basic requirements are met and that such marketing is not misleading and 
does not attempt to convey prohibited messages. A future LSRAE could also be structured as a marketing 
agency which charges lawyers marketing fees. In essence, a future LSRAE could exist as a virtual 
marketplace where consumers and lawyers meet and where lawyers are charged a fee in order to market 
their services and fees. 
Finally, a future LSRAE, client, or both could be charged a flat management fee per matter for the 
use of the LSRAE’s platform. This arrangement would require that the future LSRAE not offer legal 
services but rather, exist only as a medium on which the two conduct business. No rules of professional 
conduct appear to apply directly to the structure.  
Strategic Considerations 
Market Factors 
The data are clear — there are too many new law graduates to fill the limited number of open 
positions year over year in North America. Law firms remain competitive by generating more business 
through fewer lawyers and given the stagnant growth of the legal services industry, this trend is unlikely 
to change. There are also significant unmet personal plight legal needs. Personal plight clients are 
consciously choosing to forego legal representation in favour of self-representation because of the high 
financial, temporal, and emotional costs which come with simply finding and retaining a lawyer. Legal 
aid funding serves only a small portion of the personal plight legal industry and creates an opportunity 
cost to lawyers every time a legal aid certificate is accepted. At the same time, new law graduates are 
faced with crushing debt.  
The cumulative effect of these and other factors suggests that a large gap exists in the provision of 
legal services, a gap which has yet to be meaningfully exploited. Personal plight clients that are able to 
afford legal services, though not entirely at market rates, have legal needs which are not being met by 
lawyers. The first-to-market with a strategy to exploit the gap could potentially create a viable and 
profitable enterprise. 
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The overall regulatory environment, when considered alongside the existence of several currently 
operating LSRAEs in North America, suggests that such an enterprise is legally feasible. However, it may 
not be able to exist in the same format in every jurisdiction. The rules vary across Canadian provinces and 
the United States. As such, the business and revenue model must be sufficiently malleable to leverage the 
regulatory openings for such a future LSRAE. For instance, non-lawyers are prohibited from being paid 
to recommend a particular lawyer’s services in the United States. Lead generator fees are not permitted 
under the Ontario rules of professional conduct. Therefore, the precise legal structure of the LSRAE will 
likely need to be adjusted to each jurisdiction. 
Clients 
Several strategic considerations must be made in forming a future LSRAE, each of which 
underpin its likelihood of success. First, careful choice of the type of client to serve is critical in matching 
the services offered to those clientele. For instance, to market a LSRAE’s commercial litigation services 
to individuals is not feasible unless those individuals are entrepreneurs, small business owners, or other 
commercial operators. On the same note, incorporating some business law legal services into a future 
LSRAE appears necessary. If the future LSRAE is to operate solely as a personal plight LSRAE, such 
business law legal services may need to be limited to entrepreneurs. Should this be the case, the future 
personal plight LSRAE would also need to be backed by a significant branding campaign. This is driven 
by the nature of personal plight legal services and the nature of the clientele. Personal plight clients do not 
often expect to incur legal services costs. Moreover, the personal plight legal need usually arises out of 
some unfortunate circumstance, such as a divorce. Personal plight clients are also more likely to be price 
sensitive. Branding the future LSRAE as an answer to the high financial, temporal, and emotional costs 
will almost certainly be critical to the enterprise’s success. Generating revenues from personal plight 
needs will likely be more of a challenge than generating them from business law needs. Corporations and 
entrepreneurs, while still price sensitive though probably to a lesser degree, incur business law needs as a 
result of both growth and dispute. Corporations and entrepreneurs are also more likely to see the value in 
investing in business law legal services and less likely than their personal plight counterparts to view legal 
services spending as unnecessary, uncomfortable, or even intolerable.  
The client-facing data suggest that any future personal plight LSRAE will need to offer a client 
experience which counteracts the perceived negative aspects of hiring and retaining a lawyer. The nature 
of a LSRAE addresses the first of such aspects, high cost. Providing for enough lawyers to bid on each 
case so that competitive bids are received permits the client to pay below-market value for legal services. 
Next, the process has to be quick. Clients should be able to create a profile, upload documents, post their 
legal need, and receive bids within a short period of time. Simultaneously, the process should be intuitive 
and user-friendly. Another factor which ought to be hardwired into a future LSRAE would be a mandatory 
communication component in which clients are entitled to recurring and regular contact from their lawyer 
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with progress updates. Quick, easy processes with regular case updates for clients will reduce temporal 
and emotional costs at a time in the personal plight client’s life when they are already potentially high. It 
may be that reverse auctions are not solely about price (Schoenherr and Mabert 374-376), and thus other 
components of the LSRAE’s service — such as ease-of-use and regular communication between lawyer 
and client — may represent more of value proposition than originally anticipated.  
Another important factor which must not be overlooked is that the nature of the LSRAE controls 
for service quality. A future LSRAE client (and the LSRAE itself for that matter) will not necessarily be 
able to independently and objectively assess the quality of a bidding lawyer. This gap does not, however, 
significantly differ from the more traditional ways of finding and retaining a lawyer. Similarly, the 
information gap will probably not be a determinative factor in clients choosing not to use the future 
LSRAE’s service, although developing a way of objectively measuring legal service value might create a 
value add for clients. The development may need to include a guided, measured client-rating mechanism 
whereby clients are able to provide appropriate, contextual, and neutral feedback about lawyers for the 
use of future clients. 
Lawyers 
The largest risk to the success of a future LSRAE is the acceptance by lawyers of the service as a 
viable method of generating revenue. A LSRAE may be interpreted by lawyers as a means of 
commoditizing their services which they do not believe to be commodities (Schoenherr and Mabert 
376-377). The literature revealed that the legal services industry generally frowns upon the LSRAE 
business model. One lawyer classified the model as a race to the bottom, while still another commentator 
noted that lawyers who sign up for such a service “should be immediately disbarred, then tarred and 
feathered, then publicly humiliated,” (Ambrogi, “Shpoonkle's Gone Kershplunk”). The lack of 
overwhelming public success by a LSRAE may signify that the negative attitudes are widely shared 
amongst lawyers. Hence, any future LSRAE must specifically address the concerns of the legal 
community, while at the same time creating realistically profitable opportunities on a platform that is easy 
to use. Conversely, the economic state of the legal services industry suggests that the need for a future 
LSRAE may be imminent, which is a factor favouring the feasibility of a future LSRAE. Lawyer rejection 
of the reverse auction business model may, as in the B2B context (Schoenherr and Mabert 377-399), not 
last forever. Additional study is required. The underlying motivation for such negative commentary by 
lawyers may be simply a general aversion to change. Another factor may be that lawyers perceive various 
drawbacks to the fixed fee or contingency based billing (where allowed) which would likely be required 
to make the future LSRAE feasible.  
The structure, business model, and revenue model of the future LSRAE will need to be defined 
specifically to address the concerns of lawyers. While identifying the exact structure and models are out 
of scope of this paper, some potential strategies include: 
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• limiting the number of bidding lawyers to ensure that a realistic opportunity to be selected 
comes with each bid; 
• geographically constraining litigation matters but not constraining transactional matters; 
• offering an easy-to-use platform on which lawyers and their assistants can collaborate with 
clients; 
• integrating the platform with various law firm billing systems to ensure seamless financial 
accounting; 
• offering online coaching regarding how to make fixed rate billing more profitable; and 
• properly screening applicant lawyers to ensure that the legal services offered on the platform 
are of sufficiently high quality. 
The two most important and determinative factors in the success of a future LSRAE are expected 
to be maintaining the level of profitability for lawyers and limiting the amount of impactful change in the 
offering of legal services. Further research will be required to determine the validity of the conclusion and 
the means by which the outcomes can be achieved. 
Business Model 
There are several components of the business model which, strategically, will probably be 
important to the future LSRAE’s success. Platform collaboration will be essential to feasibility. The 
platform must permit clients to upload documents in the easiest form possible, including by photo. 
Incorporating technology which recognizes pages, similar to cheque e-deposit technology used by online 
banking applications, would increase usefulness. The platform must be compatible with the various file 
management systems used by lawyers and law firms so as to minimize any disruption to current business 
practices. It is advisable that clients be able to sign retainer documents on the platform, although a caveat 
is that lawyers are required under rules of professional conduct to positively confirm their clients’ 
identities in certain matters. Video conference technology, along with document upload capabilities, may 
satisfy the requirement. Communication via the platform may also provide significant value to both 
lawyers and clients. Providing a secure chat function which eliminates the need to communicate via other 
means, such as email or telephone, might also prove useful to both entities. Clients would likely 
appreciate the cohesiveness of the platform and could make use of the chat function to make inquiries or 
provide pertinent details to their lawyers. Correspondingly, lawyers would likely appreciate the reduction 
in email inbox clutter and telephone calls. Mandatory regular communication would probably need to be 
implemented to meet the needs of both sides. The logistics of such regular communication is out of scope 
for this paper, and further study would be required to determine how to align and maximize the 
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communications of both sides of a legal services transaction. File management, including document 
review and commentary provision, will probably be an essential function of the platform. Lawyers ought 
to be able to easily upload litigation or transactional documents to the platform, and clients ought to be 
able to provide commentary when required in such a way as to make the edited documents readable. 
The preferable fee structures offered by lawyers to clients are uncertain. Lawyers will very likely 
be opposed to bidding on client files with flat rates. Yet, flat rates will, in most cases, be the most 
preferable option to clients. Further research into how to make flat rate billing attractive to lawyers is 
required. Offering free coaching or resources which demonstrate to lawyers how to make flat rate billing 
profitable might be required to make the future LSRAE viable. Other fee structures may also provide 
access to justice and force lawyers to compete on price. For instance, lawyers could compete on hourly 
billing rate or on the percentage contingency rate charged. Alternatively, lawyers could offer the various 
forms of alternative fee arrangements noted in Table 3 and compete for clients based on the attractiveness 
of each option to the client. The critical point is that the fee structures available to be offered must 
profitable to lawyers; otherwise, the future LSRAE will not be viable. The bidding function of the 
LSRAE, when featuring the optimized number of lawyers bidding, will very likely ensure that the client 
pays a fair price for the legal services received. 
Lawyer payment ought to occur via the platform. Secure technology which permits clients to pay 
legal fees by credit card or by other electronic banking means will be essential to the success of a future 
LSRAE. Fee payment ought to be made easy to encourage clients to make use of the future LSRAE. 
Service may include offering clients credit. As Noel Semple points out, many industries, such as banks 
and car dealers, offer deferred payment options on the purchase of major assets, such as mortgages and 
vehicles, respectively (Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 54). Deferring client payment by offering, 
for instance, regular interval automatic bank withdrawals may increase the likelihood that a client would 
make use of a future LSRAE which would, in turn, increase revenue. In addition, offering credit to clients 
may also generate additional revenue in the form of interest payments. Clients are able to access justice at 
no or low upfront cost, while spreading out the payment of those legal services over time. At the same 
time, guaranteeing payment to lawyers would likely increase the value added for lawyers because it 
eliminates the non-payment risk (Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 54). However, the non-
payment risk here is transferred to the future LSRAE which may decrease viability. The arrangement 
creates credit risk exposure for the LSRAE and, hence, this component of the LSRAE requires further 
study. As a general statement, revenue generation for the future LSRAE will need to be carefully 
structured to maximize client interest, lawyer acceptance, and revenue generated.  
Client-Generated Revenue 
The literature suggests that clients prefer not to pay for initial consultations, or pre-matter fees, 
which may limit the success of requiring clients to pay a deposit of any sort. Further study is 
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recommended as to how best, or whether, to incorporate a client deposit or pre-matter fee of some sort. A 
deposit would offer a measure of security to ensure that a client actually selects a bidding lawyer rather 
than simply engage in price shopping. However, charging clients a post-matter fee is likely to be, in most 
cases, prohibitive. This may not be the case if the fee charged to the client is proportionate to the amount 
the client saves over market value (and further research would be well served to explore this avenue). 
Businesses and entrepreneurs may be more likely to pay a file management fee or fee proportionate to 
savings, given the increased rationality of such clientele. 
Lawyer-Generated Revenue 
Across North America, various constraints exist in the ways lawyers can pay others to generate 
revenue for themselves or their law firms. For instance, charging referral fees is strictly regulated by the 
various lawyer regulatory bodies. Referral fees, a fee exacted by the future LSRAE to lawyers 
commensurate with the legal services fee to be charged, are easily the most preferred method of revenue 
generation because the interests of the future LSRAE and the lawyer are aligned. The more revenue the 
lawyer generates, the more revenue the LSRAE generates. Yet, the future LSRAE is also interested in 
providing an avenue for clients to save money on legal fees. As well, future study as to the precise legal 
structure of the LSRAE, be it as a corporation or professional corporation, is required. The decision will, 
in part, determine the way in which clients and lawyers are charged fees. Half of the successful LSRAEs 
charge lawyers a subscription fee, so it may be that this is the most viable method to generate lawyer-
based revenue.  
There are two components to the geographical scope factor which would likely impact success. 
The first is that the legal services industry, an industry which is highly regulated and which regulation 
differs by state or provincial jurisdiction, is structured such that geographical scope must be carefully 
considered when forming a new LSRAE. Different jurisdictions may provide better access to both clients 
and lawyers, and these considerations must be taken into account. Analysis of the regulatory environment 
revealed variations exist in the way in which a future LSRAE must operate across North American 
jurisdictions. For example, it may not be advisable, depending on the legal structure of the LSRAE, to 
commence operations in Ontario. Operations ought to be commenced in a jurisdiction more favourable to 
liberal legal services marketing. The second component is that the future LSRAE ought probably to 
commence operations in a single city and expand outward appropriately. Strategically, this execution 
allows the LSRAE to build a brand at a lower initial cost than were it to do so on a jurisdictional or 
parent-jurisdictional basis. As the concept and brand are built, the future LSRAE can expand into other 
cities both within and outside the initial jurisdiction. Mid-sized cities may be the most appropriate starting 
points, given the saturation of the legal services markets in major cities like Toronto or New York City. 
The platform can be tweaked at minimal opportunity or reputation cost to maximize its efficiency on a 
single-city basis and then, upon reaching a base effectiveness, expand outwards.  
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Ethical Issues 
Potential unethical practices by both clients and lawyers within the LSRAE platform warrants 
additional study. Even though their study was conducted on B2B reverse auctions, Charki et al. identified 
several possible ways in which buyers and suppliers can manipulate the reverse auction platform. Misuse 
of the platform could lead to significant brand degradation, and, thus, appropriate safeguards must be 
implemented in the new venture to guard against this possibility. Further study ought to identify the likely 
unethical practices which may arise in B2C reverse auctions and how to best protect against them. 
Strategic Partnerships 
A LSRAE could be well served to strategically partner with lawyer regulatory bodies in the 
jurisdictions in which it operates. The strategy is currently employed by Legal Services Link in Arizona 
and appears to have been used previously by Legalmatch. Strategic partnerships with regulatory bodies 
likely offer a future LSRAE industry credibility. Such partnerships would decrease any concern lawyers 
may have related to breaching rules of professional conduct by participating in reverse auctions. 
Simultaneously, such partnerships might also reduce the professional or legal liability the LSRAE may 
face in offering lead generator, referral, or matching services. Conversely, there is some risk in attempting 
to partner or obtain endorsements by lawyer regulatory bodies. Should a regulatory body elect not to 
endorse or partner with the LSRAE, this may signal to lawyers under its jurisdiction that the service is 
illegitimate or even illegal. Additional research to determine jurisdictions favourable to a new LSRAE 
venture is advisable prior to seeking regulatory partnerships or endorsements.  
Lessons Learned & Assessment of Feasibility 
The comparison of the successful and unsuccessful LSRAEs illustrates that the focus of a LSRAE 
must be, counter-intuitively, placed on the lawyer rather than the client. The timing of the venture entering 
the market must correspond with an industry-wide deficit of positions available for new law graduates. If 
new law grads and lawyers generally are sufficiently employed, any future LSRAE will almost certainly 
not succeed. The willingness of lawyers to aggressively compete on price is tied to the income-earning 
consequences which come with an oversupply of service providers. A lawyer would never aggressively 
compete on price (unless it were necessary to earn sufficient income to support the costs of being a 
lawyer, which include paying back tens of thousands of dollars in student debt). 
The profitability to lawyers of participation in the future LSRAE is also critical to the LSRAE’s 
success. Lawyer resistance to technological advancement, to change in the way in which legal services 
are offered, to the use of flat fees, and a general aversion to participating in a ‘race to the bottom’ strongly 
suggests that any future LSRAE must be created with lawyers first in mind. Significant consultation as to 
what personal plight and personal business lawyers would look for in a LSRAE will be necessary to 
produce an enterprise which encourages buy-in. Further study is necessary as to the types of fee structures 
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available, how best to incorporate client participation (while minimizing unnecessary client interaction), 
how to permit lawyers to bid on each client posting, how to select lawyers given the chance to bid, how to 
structure collaboration, how to charge lawyers to use the LSRAE platform, and how to post client matters.  
A future LSRAE will probably not have significant trouble attracting clients, pending a strong 
marketing campaign. Future study as to how to best attract clients is advisable. However, the basic 
premise of the LSRAE will generally be attractive to individuals seeking personal plight or personal 
business legal services, those generally are unable to afford the market rates of legal services. The 
literature also strongly demonstrates that, from the client side, demand will be significant. On average, a 
large portion of the people will experience a personal plight legal need at some point in their life, and 
legal aid is inaccessible for many persons. Market rates are generally unaffordable to those in need of 
personal plight legal services, even to some lawyers. Building a brand which emphasizes price certainty, 
fair pricing, payment options, and quality legal service — while at the same time instilling trust — ought 
to sufficiently attract clientele. 
Starting small and building out will probably be the most cost-effective way of accomplishing 
brand recognition. The legal structure of a future LSRAE may prohibit non-lawyer investment, which will 
mandate organic growth funded by cash flows and debt. Building a brand in a single city and leveraging 
success in that city to fund expansions elsewhere is likely to be the most effective way of navigating the 
investment regulatory challenge. 
The absence of peer-reviewed B2C reverse auction enterpreneurship literature reveals that 
additional study is required to determine how to best structure a new LSRAE venture. Additional study 
will be augmented by explorations of other industries that make use of reverse auction websites, such as 
Price Line, but less so by explorations of industries that make use of online information matching services 
(Etemad 356-358). Incorporating the B2B reverse auction literature into the analyses may still be helpful, 
however. For instance, it would be helpful in the B2C context to test the myths debunked by Schoenherr 
and Mabert (373-384) in the B2B context. 
Given the above, a LSRAE venture appears to be feasible both in Canada and the United States, 
from a contextual, economic, managerial perspective. Were the conclusion not so, no successful LSRAEs 
would be currently operating. Further research is required in three main areas — lawyer on-boarding, 
client acquisition, and business structure — to further identify how to best execute a future LSRAE to be 
profitable. 
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CHAPTER 7 — CONCLUSION 
Accessing justice is difficult for many in Canada and the United States. Low- and middle-income 
earners have nearly a 50% chance of experiencing a personal plight legal issue every three years (Farrow 
1, 7-8; Semple, Accessibility, Quality, and Profitability 21). Personal plight legal issues, such as divorces, 
home repossession, personal injury, and criminal charges, are dispute-based and are often not events for 
which such person can plan or budget. Moreover, even if the issues were predictable in advance, the costs 
associated with addressing them are extraordinary.  
Most lawyers bill matters using the billable hour, a method whereby the lawyer works on a matter 
until its conclusion or the client stipulates otherwise, keeps track of his or her time while doing so, tallies 
the number of hours spent resolving the matter, multiplies the total number of hours worked by an hourly 
rate, then adds the applicable taxes and other costs to the bill before sending it to the client and expecting 
relatively prompt payment. In Canada, average hourly rates range from over $200 to over $500, 
depending on the experience level of the lawyer. In the end, a contested divorce will likely cost each side 
between $7,500 and $12,500. A one-day criminal trial averages between $5,000 and $8,000. However, 
such matters are not on average predictable, and such costs cannot budgeted by low- and middle-income 
earners. As well, state funding of legal services is reserved for the lowest of low-income earners. The 
individual afflicted, who is already in an uncomfortable state by having experienced a personal plight 
legal issue, is then left with the prospect of paying thousands of dollars with no price certainty.  
This situation, however, is just the beginning. Individual must find lawyers to represent them. The 
costs of doing so can be enormous. The individual must dedicate time to searching for lawyers without 
the benefit of a way of objectively assessing whether the potential lawyers offer high-quality services. 
Lawyers most often do not advertise their rates, which then puts clients in a position to have to attend 
multiple initial consultations. At these consultations, the individual will learn of the hourly rates or 
alternative billing options which the lawyer may make use of but, absent a fixed rate, will be left to guess 
about the amount of the final legal bill. All the while, emotional costs build. Overall, the process is not 
enjoyable, and adds to the stresses which the personal plight legal matter has already created. The 
structure and economics of the legal services industry illustrates why potential personal plight clients are 
often forced to represent themselves.  
The other side of the relationship is also fraught with pressures. Offering legal services is an 
inherently costly proposition. Individuals interested in becoming a lawyer invest several years and tens of 
thousands of dollars into the requisite legal education. Upon graduation, if the individuals are fortunate to 
find a job as a lawyer, they will work as many hours as they can to demonstrate to their employer that 
they add value to the law firm. When billing by the hour, lawyers and law firms accomplish two things. 
First, they eliminate labour requirement risk. It does not matter how many hours a dispute is likely to 
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require to be resolved when each hour worked will be remunerated. Second, the billable hour tacitly 
encourages inefficient work in order to maximize billings and profit on a particular file. This is especially 
so for young lawyers looking to remain employed in a market that favours employers. Since the 
late-2000’s, finding a job has become increasingly difficult. Some studies show that there are too many 
new law graduates for available lawyer positions every year. Others suggest that demand for legal 
services is relatively constant. While law schools in Canada and the United States continue to produce 
graduates, law firms do not — and perhaps cannot — hire at rates to support such graduation levels. The 
situation leaves many new lawyers without the means to pay back the tens of thousands of dollars in debt 
and requires those who are hired to work as many hours as they can. All else being equal, the access to 
justice crisis which exists in Canada and the United States will not soon dissolve in the current industry 
structure. 
Innovative enterprises which can navigate the various regulatory constraints are required to 
address the sparsity of access to justice for low- and middle-income earners. Such income earners, though 
they may not be able to afford market rates for legal services, often do have some money to spend, be it 
by lump sum or over time. Yet, many of these individuals choose to self-represent or to not seek justice 
rather than face the uncertainty of the legal services bill. A reverse auction business model which offers a 
platform where consumers post legal needs and certain lawyers are permitted to bid on the offering of 
those services may be the innovative solution to address the sizeable gap in the marketplace currently 
underserved by lawyers. The purpose of the paper was to determine, based on the performance of several 
enterprises which have gone to market with similar business models, whether or not the reverse auction 
model for legal services is feasible.  
Extensive research uncovered twenty-one previous attempts at bringing a legal services reverse 
auction enterprise to market. Of these, eight were deemed to be successful by having existed for longer 
than three years and for continuing to offer services to date. The remaining thirteen were deemed 
unsuccessful for having failed to operate as a going concern. The enterprises were examined for 
commonalities and differences across several factors, including the fashion in which each offered services 
to both clients and lawyers. Similarities between successful ventures were noted and compared to the 
various methods in which unsuccessful brought services to market and ultimately failed. In total, four 
clear themes of difference emerged. 
First, the timing of going to market appears to have made a difference. Unsuccessful ventures 
were generally launched prior to the effects of the 2008 financial downturn taking hold of the legal 
services industry. Conversely, most of the successful LSRAEs were launch in the wake of the North 
American economy’s collapse and oversupply of lawyers. Second, a LSRAE should probably operate on a 
national basis, although its growth strategy to reach individual jurisdictions must be tailored to meet the 
unique conditions underlying external investment in the legal services industry. Third, the analysis 
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suggests that the LSRAE must generate revenue from the lawyer as opposed to the client and it must do 
so by creating a user-friendly, all-encompassing platform and by limiting the number of lawyers that can 
bid on any particular client posting. Finally, to be profitable, the LSRAE must offer a wide range of legal 
services on its platform, including entrepreneur and business law services. 
Additional findings were made concerning business strategy. The regulatory environments in 
North American jurisdictions were found generally to permit a LSRAE to operate despite different 
structures being required in some to avoid legal liability. Client acceptance of the business model was 
found to be likely after a strong branding campaign as long as certain criteria, such as regular 
communication, are incorporated into the platform. Lawyers were identified as the most critical party to 
the success of a LSRAE. Lawyer acceptance of the business model will likely be difficult and thus further 
study is required on how to best attract lawyers to the LSRAE venture. Several possible solutions were 
identified, including platform integration with law firm software, coaching, and lawyer screening. 
Constraining the legal work and exchange of funds to the platform so as to eliminate extraneous variables 
was also identified as strategically advisable. Ensuring that a plethora of fee structures are available on 
the new LSRAE venture was indicated as important, even though further research will be required to 
determine how best to balance the differing needs of the clients and lawyers. Litigation funding and 
payment guarantees were proposed as potential value-additions for lawyers, although this shifts non-
payment risk to the LSRAE and thus requires further study. Moreover, capital intensity is likely to rise 
significantly as a result of increased platform capabilities and payment guarantees for lawyers being built 
into the business model. Unethical bidding practices were identified as a significant risk that a LSRAE 
could encounter, and further study was recommended to determine how this may occur and the extent to 
which it could be prevented. Finally, partnerships with law and bar societies was proposed with caution as 
a beneficial strategy, given the industry credibility that a new LSRAE venture would acquire in the 
process. 
The exploratory study into the creation of a new LSRAE venture determined thatLlaunching a 
new LSRAE is likely viable pending further study. Significant future research is required into how to best 
structure and bring to market the new venture. Despite their limitations, the results of this exploratory 
study suggest valuable contributions can be made to both the state of knowledge and to practice as they 
concern LSRAEs and access to justice. 
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Appendix A — Aggregated Markers of Pre-Existing Legal Services Reverse Auction 
Enterprises
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odel
Sources
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L
aw
yerB
id
2010
2010*
1
U
TX
PP
I
U
-clients creates profile 
-clients anonym
ously post legal 
needs 
-law
yers bid on w
ork
(Law
yerB
id, 
“Law
yerB
id”; Law
yerB
id, 
“Law
yerB
id.com
”; 
M
atthias R
hoads, 
“Law
yerB
id.com
”).
L
aw
yersForL
ess
N
o available inform
ation
L
aw
yersQ
uoteFast
N
o available inform
ation
L
egal Services 
L
ink
2015
A
4
-A
Z 
V
irgin 
Islands, -
M
ilitary 
Spouse JD
 
N
etw
ork 
w
ith official 
partnerships
, nationally 
to date
C
hicago
FS
I B
LF
-clients sign up for a free account 
-clients then post anonym
ous legal 
needs 
-qualified law
yers get notifications 
im
m
ediately and m
ake applications 
to w
ork for the client 
-law
yers give price estim
ates 
-client selects w
inning law
yer 
-law
yer and client m
eet at law
yer’s 
office to finalize retainer 
-law
yer pays $250/year for access 
to listings and unlim
ited 
applications sent to clients 
-can com
plete postings online or 
m
obile 
-three hundred fifty attorneys in 
July 2016 
-seven hundred law
yers/600 clients 
in D
ecem
ber 2016 
-m
ost responding law
yers are sole 
practitioners or from
 sm
all-m
edium
 
sized firm
s 
-tw
o thousand attorneys and 1,500 
live projects in January 2018 
-approved by A
rizona bar on 
O
ctober 21, 2016 for $300,000 
-pay a revenue share to A
Z B
ar
(B
anerjee, “A
ttorney 
creates app”; crunchbase, 
“Legal Services Link”; 
H
ernandez, "Folly on the 
loose”; H
orn, 
“A
nnouncing”; H
orn, 
“H
ow
 Legal Services 
Link”; H
orn &
 
C
altagirone, “Interview
”; 
Legal Services Link, 
“A
ttorney/C
lient 
M
atching A
pp”; Legal 
Services Link, "H
ow
 it 
W
orks”; O
lson, “W
hen 
Finding the R
ight 
Law
yer”; State B
ar of 
A
rizona, “M
inutes”; State 
B
ar of A
rizona, “2018 
B
udget”; R
ekdal, “This 
startup”).
O
pened
C
losed
L
ifespan 
(years)
G
eographic 
Scope
H
Q
L
egal 
Services 
Scope
C
lient 
Scope
R
evenue 
M
odel
B
usiness M
odel
Sources
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legalm
atch
1999
A
20
N
FS
I B
LF
-client posts legal need 
-law
yers are im
m
ediately m
atched 
to the case w
ithout seeing client 
info 
-interested law
yers respond w
ith 
details &
 pricing structure 
-client selects law
yer 
-law
yers pay m
onthly subscription 
fee 
-over 4 m
illion cases posted 
-law
yers can offer flat, hourly, or 
contingent fees
(crunchbase, 
“Legalm
atch”; 
Legalm
atch, “H
ow
 it 
W
orks”; Prikash, 
“LegalM
atch R
eview
”).
M
yL
aw
B
id
2011
2015*
4
N
 (C
an)
Toronto
PP 
B
B
I B
U
-clients post R
FPs 
-registered law
yers can bid on the 
R
FPs 
-one hundred law
yers signed up in 
first few
 m
onths 
-tw
o hundred law
yers registered by 
2012
(crunchbase, 
“M
yLaw
B
id”; K
roeker, 
“Law
yer’s new
 business”; 
M
yLaw
B
id, “Find a 
Law
yer - Tour of 
M
yLaw
B
id”; M
yLaw
B
id; 
“M
yLaw
B
id”; Techvibes, 
“Save Tim
e and 
M
oney”;).
priorilegal
2011
A
8
N
B
L
B
-clients subm
it R
FPs 
-Priori case m
anager confirm
s legal 
need w
ith client 
-priori creates custom
ized m
atch of 
law
yers 
-law
yers send details, pricing 
structures 
-can offer hourly, flat, subscription, 
capped, or contingent fees 
-client engages w
ith law
yers and 
selects w
inning law
yer
(crunchbase, “priorilegal”; 
priorilegal, “H
ow
 it 
W
orks”).
Shpoonkle
2011
2014*
3
N
 (U
S) 
N
 (C
an)
N
Y
C
U
U
U
-clients post legal services needs 
-law
yers in the local area of the 
client are notified and invited to bid 
-tw
o thousand one hundred law
yers 
had registered in less than a year 
-hourly or contingency
(A
m
brogi, “Shpoonkle's 
G
one K
ershplunk”; 
M
cK
endrick, “eB
ay of 
legal services”; O
’D
ell, 
“Stupid nam
e”; Popper, 
“M
eet Shpoonkle”).
O
pened
C
losed
L
ifespan 
(years)
G
eographic 
Scope
H
Q
L
egal 
Services 
Scope
C
lient 
Scope
R
evenue 
M
odel
B
usiness M
odel
Sources
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U
pC
ounsel
2012
A
7
N
B
L
B
 
E
R
F
-six funding rounds has raised $26 
M
illion 
-client posts legal need  
-w
ebsite algorithm
 m
atches 
qualified law
yers w
ho review
 the 
legal need and propose solutions 
including hourly or flat fee rates 
-clients book free phone 
consultations 
-client hires a law
yer and uses 
w
ebsite’s technology to collaborate 
online 
-w
ebsite allow
s for clients to select 
law
yers again for future legal w
ork 
-each law
yer has a profile on the 
w
ebsite 
-also offers com
panies the 
equivalent of short-term
 in-house 
counsel staffing 
-U
pC
ounsel takes a 5%
 fee 
-reduces law
yer adm
in costs
(crunchbase, 
“U
pC
ounsel”; U
pC
ounsel, 
“A
ttorneys”; U
pC
ounsel, 
“Enterprise”; U
pC
ounsel, 
“H
ow
 it W
orks”). 
O
pened
C
losed
L
ifespan 
(years)
G
eographic 
Scope
H
Q
L
egal 
Services 
Scope
C
lient 
Scope
R
evenue 
M
odel
B
usiness M
odel
Sources
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Appendix B — Arizona State Bar Extension of Legal Services Link Contract  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1
Patricia Seguin
From: Lisa Panahi
Sent: Thursday, December 27, 2018 6:29 PM
To: Patricia Seguin
Subject: Fwd: LSL Renewal
 
Sent from my Verizon 4G LTE Droid 
---------- Forwarded message ---------- 
From: "John F. Phelps" <John.Phelps@staff.azbar.org> 
Date: Dec 26, 2018 1:13 PM 
Subject: LSL Renewal 
To: Matthew Horn <mhorn@legalserviceslink.com>,Ryan Caltagirone <rcaltagirone@legalserviceslink.com> 
Cc: Lisa Panahi <Lisa.Panahi@staff.azbar.org>,"Rick R. DeBruhl" <Rick.DeBruhl@staff.azbar.org>,Lori 
Maxwell <lori.maxwell@staff.azbar.org> 
 
Matt and Ryan:  This email serves as the State Bar’s notice to Legal Services Link that the State Bar 
is exercising its first option to renew The Software License, Development and Revenue Share 
Agreement for an additional one year term, effective March 17, 2019 through March 16, 2020. 
  
Wishing you and your families a wonderful holiday season and prosperous New Year! 
  
Warm Regards, 
  
John 
  
 
  
John Phelps, CEO/Executive Director 
State Bar of Arizona 
4201 N. 24th St., Suite 100 | Phoenix, AZ  85016-6266 
T : 602.340.7200  F : 602.416.7400 
EMAIL: John.Phelps@staff.azbar.org 
www.azbar.org 
  
Serving the public and enhancing the legal profession. 
  
  
  
  
  
 
Appendix C — Successful LSRAE Business Model Characteristics
LEG
EN
D
 
Y
 = Yes 
N
 = N
o 
U
 = unknow
n 
A
Q
 = A
ll Q
ualified 
G
C
 = G
eographically C
onstrained 
SC
 = Subset of Q
ualified 
A
G
 = A
lgorithm
  
P = Platform
 
O
F = O
ff Platform
 
H
= H
ourly 
F = Flat 
C
 = C
ontingency 
C
A
P = C
apped 
SU
B
 = Subscription
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SU
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C
E
SSFU
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C
lient 
A
ccount
U
pload 
D
ocum
ents
C
lient Sets 
B
udget 
B
efore B
ids
L
aw
yer 
Selection 
by L
SR
A
E
R
etainer 
Process
Fee 
Structure 
Availability
C
ollaborate 
on 
Platform
 or 
O
ffline
E
xternal 
Investm
ent
L
aw
yer 
Paym
ent
R
evenue M
odel
Sources
B
ernieSez
Y
Y
U
A
Q
U
U
P
U
P
M
onthly 
subscription fees 
ranging from
 $50-
$200
(B
ernieSez, 
“Pricing”; 
crunchbase, 
“B
ernieSez”) 
law
dingo
Y
U
U
U
P
U
P
$810,000 
over 4 
rounds
P
Law
yer bids to 
have profile show
n 
to clients
(A
brom
ow
itz, 
“U
ber for 
Law
yers”; 
crunchbase, 
“Law
dingo”; H
a, 
“Law
dingo”; 
H
abib, “Find a 
Law
yer Free”; 
Law
dingo, “H
ow
 
it W
orks”).
L
aw
ger
Y
Y
Y
A
Q
O
F
U
P
U
P
Transactional 
technology fee
(Law
ger, “H
ow
 it 
W
orks”)
law
trades
Y
U
U
U
P
F
P
$2.7M
 over 
2 rounds
P
Law
yers pay 
annual access fee of 
$300 
-estim
ated $17.6M
 
in annual revenue
(Aviso, “Law
 
Trades U
ser 
R
eview
s”; 
crunchbase, 
“Law
trades”; 
Law
trades, 
“O
nline Legal 
Services”; 500 
Startups, 
“Law
trades”).
SU
C
C
E
SSFU
L L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
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L
egal 
Services 
L
ink
Y
U
N
G
C
O
F
U
O
F
U
U
Law
yers pay a 
$250 per year 
subscription for 
access to client 
postings and 
unlim
ited bids
(B
anerjee, 
“A
ttorney creates 
app”; crunchbase, 
“Legal Services 
Link”; H
ernandez, 
"Folly on the 
loose”; H
orn, 
“A
nnouncing”; 
H
orn, “H
ow
 Legal 
Services Link”; 
H
orn &
 
C
altagirone, 
“Interview
”; Legal 
Services Link, 
“A
ttorney/C
lient 
M
atching A
pp”; 
Legal Services 
Link, "H
ow
 it 
W
orks”; O
lson, 
“W
hen Finding 
the R
ight 
Law
yer”; R
ekdal, 
“This startup”). 
legalm
atch
Y
U
U
G
C
O
F
H
, F, C
P
U
O
F
M
onthly 
subscription fee
(crunchbase, 
“Legalm
atch”; 
Legalm
atch, 
“H
ow
 it W
orks”; 
Prikash, 
“LegalM
atch 
R
eview
”).
priorilegal
Y
Y
U
SC
P
H
, F, C
, 
C
A
P, SU
B
P
U
P
C
lient pays 10%
 
m
anagem
ent fee
(crunchbase, 
“priorilegal”; 
priorilegal, “H
ow
 
it W
orks”).
SU
C
C
E
SSFU
L L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
C
lient 
A
ccount
U
pload 
D
ocum
ents
C
lient Sets 
B
udget 
B
efore B
ids
L
aw
yer 
Selection 
by L
SR
A
E
R
etainer 
Process
Fee 
Structure 
Availability
C
ollaborate 
on 
Platform
 or 
O
ffline
E
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ent
L
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R
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U
pC
ounsel
Y
Y
N
A
G
P or O
F
H
, F
P
6 rounds, 
$26M
P
C
lient pays a 5%
 
referral fee
(crunchbase, 
“U
pC
ounsel”; 
U
pC
ounsel, 
“A
ttorneys”; 
U
pC
ounsel, 
“Enterprise”; 
U
pC
ounsel, “H
ow
 
it W
orks”). 
SU
C
C
E
SSFU
L L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
C
lient 
A
ccount
U
pload 
D
ocum
ents
C
lient Sets 
B
udget 
B
efore B
ids
L
aw
yer 
Selection 
by L
SR
A
E
R
etainer 
Process
Fee 
Structure 
Availability
C
ollaborate 
on 
Platform
 or 
O
ffline
E
xternal 
Investm
ent
L
aw
yer 
Paym
ent
R
evenue M
odel
Sources
SU
C
C
E
SSFU
L L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
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Appendix D — Failed LSRAE Business Model Characteristics
LEG
EN
D
 
Y
 = Yes 
N
 = N
o 
U
 = unknow
n 
A
Q
 = A
ll Q
ualified 
G
C
 = G
eographically C
onstrained 
SC
 = Subset of Q
ualified 
A
G
 = A
lgorithm
  
P = Platform
 
O
F = O
ff Platform
 
H
= H
ourly 
F = Flat 
C
 = C
ontingency 
C
A
P = C
apped 
SU
B
 = Subscription
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C
lient 
A
ccount
U
pload 
D
ocum
ents
C
lient 
Sets 
B
udget 
B
efore 
B
ids
L
aw
yer 
Selection 
by 
L
SR
A
E
R
etainer 
Process
Fee 
Structure 
Availability
C
ollaborate 
on Platform
 
or O
ffline
E
xternal 
Investm
ent
L
aw
yer 
Paym
ent
R
evenue 
M
odel
Sources
B
idsFrom
L
aw
yers
Y
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
Law
yer pays 
$19.95 
m
onthly  
m
em
bership 
fee
(A
m
brogi, 
“Shpoonkle's G
one 
K
ershplunk”; 
B
idsFrom
Law
yers, 
“Legal H
elp 
N
eeded?”; D
erden, 
“Jeff D
erden”).
E
agleFee
Y
Y
U
G
C
U
C
U
U
U
Law
yer pays 
an offer fee of 
$25 for every 
offer sent to a 
client
(A
m
brogi, 
“Shpoonkle's G
one 
K
ershplunk”; 
EagleFee, 
“EagleFee”; 
EagleFee, “FA
Q
”; 
EagleFee, “State by 
State List of U
seful 
Sites for A
ccident 
V
ictim
s”; K
olle, 
“Tyler K
olle”).
eL
aw
Forum
U
U
U
A
Q
U
F
U
U
U
C
lient pays a 
percentage of 
savings based 
on estim
ated 
cost of 
litigation
(A
m
erican B
ar 
A
ssociation 
C
om
m
ission on 
B
illable H
ours, 
“R
eport”; 
C
hristenson, 
“eLaw
Forum
”; 
D
rystone C
apital, 
“D
rystone C
apital”; 
H
enry, “eLaw
Forum
 
Litigation Portfolio”).
E
xpertB
ids 
Y
U
U
A
Q
U
F, H
U
U
U
Law
yer pays 
$14.95 fee 
w
hen selected
(accountingW
EB
, 
"ExpertB
ids.com
"; 
crunchbase, 
“Expertbids”).
FA
IL
E
D
 L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
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H
ireM
eL
egal
Y
U
U
A
Q
O
F
U
O
F
U
P
C
lient pays a 
10%
 service 
fee
(H
ireM
eLegal, 
“A
bout U
s”; 
H
ireM
eLegal, 
“H
ireM
eLegal”; Lee, 
“#LegalTech 
Startups”; W
ick, 
“Legal Experts”). 
Jam
m
edU
p
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
(crunchbase, 
“Jam
m
edU
p”; 
R
osenberg, “N
ew
 
site”).
Jurbid
N
o available inform
ation
L
aw
Pitch
Y
U
Y
G
C
O
F
F
O
F
U
P
U
(Law
Pitch, “H
ow
 it 
W
orks”).
L
aw
yerB
id
Y
U
U
A
G
U
U
U
U
U
U
(Law
yerB
id, 
“Law
yerB
id”; 
Law
yerB
id, 
“Law
yerB
id.com
”; 
M
atthias R
hoads, 
“Law
yerB
id.com
”).
L
aw
yersForL
ess
N
o available inform
ation
L
aw
yersQ
uoteFast
N
o available inform
ation
M
yL
aw
B
id
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
(crunchbase, 
“M
yLaw
B
id”; 
K
roeker, “Law
yer’s 
new
 business”; 
M
yLaw
B
id, “Find a 
Law
yer - Tour of 
M
yLaw
B
id”; 
M
yLaw
B
id; 
“M
yLaw
B
id”; 
Techvibes, “Save 
Tim
e and M
oney”;).
FA
IL
E
D
 L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
C
lient 
A
ccount
U
pload 
D
ocum
ents
C
lient 
Sets 
B
udget 
B
efore 
B
ids
L
aw
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Selection 
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L
SR
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E
R
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Structure 
Availability
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ollaborate 
on Platform
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Shpoonkle
U
U
U
G
C
U
H
, C
U
U
U
U
(A
m
brogi, 
“Shpoonkle's G
one 
K
ershplunk”; 
M
cK
endrick, “eB
ay 
of legal services”; 
O
’D
ell, “Stupid 
nam
e”; Popper, 
“M
eet Shpoonkle”).
FA
IL
E
D
 L
SR
A
E
s B
U
SIN
E
SS M
O
D
E
L
S
C
lient 
A
ccount
U
pload 
D
ocum
ents
C
lient 
Sets 
B
udget 
B
efore 
B
ids
L
aw
yer 
Selection 
by 
L
SR
A
E
R
etainer 
Process
Fee 
Structure 
Availability
C
ollaborate 
on Platform
 
or O
ffline
E
xternal 
Investm
ent
L
aw
yer 
Paym
ent
R
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M
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Sources
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Appendix E — Relevant Regulatory Constraints on the Practices of Lawyers and Law 
Firms 
Jurisdiction
Referral Fees
Lead 
Generator 
Fees
Division of 
Fees 
Permitted 
to Lawyers 
in Other 
Firm or 
Prohibited
Marketing 
Permitted
Rules Sources
Lawyers 
Only, 
Referral 
Service 
Anyone, 
Prohibited
Cap Legal Services
Legal 
Fees
British 
Columbia
Lawyers 
Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(The Law Society 
of British 
Columbia, Code of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Alberta Lawyers Only Reasonable 
If not linked to 
specific matter Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Law Society of 
Alberta, Code of 
Conduct).
Manitoba Lawyers Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(The Law Society 
of Manitoba, Code 
of Professional 
Conduct).
Newfoundland 
& Labrodor
Lawyers 
Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(The Law Society 
of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Code 
of Professional 
Conduct).
New 
Brunswick
Lawyers 
Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Law Society of 
New Brunswick, 
Code of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Northwest 
Territories
Lawyers 
Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes
3(10); 
4(13)
(Law Society of the 
Northwest 
Territories, Code of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Nova Scotia Lawyers Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Nova Scotia 
Barrister’s Society, 
Code of 
Professional 
Conduct)
Nunavut Lawyers Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Law Society of 
Nunavut, 
Ontario Lawyers Only
15% of first 
$50,000; 5% 
of additional 
fees to a 
maximum of 
$25,000
Prohibited Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Law Society of 
Ontario, Rules of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Prince 
Edward Island
Lawyers
Reasonable Allowed Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(The Law Society 
of Prince Edward 
Island, Code of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Referral 
Service
Quebec Lawyers Only Reasonable Unknown Permitted Yes Yes
106; 
107; 
145; 
146; 147
(Barreau du 
Québec, Code of 
Professional 
Conduct of 
Lawyers)
!  72
Saskatchewan Lawyers Only Reasonable 
If may refer 
clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Law Society of 
Saskatchewan, 
Code of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Yukon Anyone Reasonable If may refer clients generally Permitted Yes Yes 3.6; 4.2
(Law Society of 
Yukon, Code of 
Professional 
Conduct).
California
Lawyers, None
Allowed Permitted Yes Yes
1-320; 
1.5.1; 
7.2
(State Bar of 
California, “Lawyer 
Referral Service 
Provider 
Certification”; State 
Bar of California, 
Rules of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Referral 
Service
Prescribed 
referral fee
Rest of the 
United States
Lawyers 
Only Proportionate Allowed Permitted Yes Yes
1.5; 5.4; 
7.2
(American Bar 
Association, Model 
Rules of 
Professional 
Conduct).
Referral Fees
Lead 
Generator 
Fees
Division of 
Fees 
Permitted 
to Lawyers 
in Other 
Firm or 
Prohibited
Marketing 
Permitted
Rules Sources
Lawyers 
Only, 
Referral 
Service 
Anyone, 
Prohibited
Cap Legal Services
Legal 
Fees
Jurisdiction
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